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1. Introduction  and  Overview 
Asset  market data are often ignored  in evaluating  macroeconomic  mod- 
els, and aggregate quantity data are often avoided  in empirical investiga- 
tions  of asset  market returns.  While  there  may  be  short-term  benefits 
to proceeding  along  separate  lines,  we  argue that security  market data 
are among  the  most  sensitive  and,  hence,  attractive  proving  grounds 
for models  of the  aggregate  economy. 
An important strand of research on economic  fluctuation uses  models 
without  frictions to explain the movements  of aggregate quantities  (e.g., 
Kydland and Prescott,  1982; Long and Plosser,  1983). Historically,  asset 
market data have played  little, if any,  role in assessing  the performance 
of these  models.  This habit is surprising.  The models  center on intertem- 
poral decisions,  and asset  prices provide  information  about intertempo- 
ral  marginal  rates  of  substitution  and  transformation.  Hence,  asset 
market data should  be valuable in assessing  alternative model  specifica- 
tions.  Once the basic point  that equilibrium  models  can explain  particu- 
lar quantity  correlations  has  been  made,  one  would  expect  extensive 
use  of  price  data  in  general  and  asset  price  data  in  particular to  sort 
among  the many  specifications  of preferences  and technology  that give 
roughly  similar predictions  for quantity  correlations. 
It is sometimes  argued  that successful  models  connecting  real quanti- 
ties to security market data may have  to feature frictions,  such as trans- 
actions costs,  imperfect  markets,  liquidity or borrowing  constraints,  etc. 
(For an articulation of this view,  see Mehra and Prescott,  1985). If, how- 
ever,  marginal rates of substitution  are disconnected  from asset returns 
because  of frictions, why  should  one still expect marginal rates of substi- 
tution  to line  up  with  marginal  rates of transformation?  If market fric- 116 *  COCHRANE  & HANSEN 
tions are necessary  to understand  asset price data, they have potentially 
serious  implications  for  the  quantity  predictions  of  business  cycle 
models. 
Perhaps  the  most  convincing  evidence  for our view  is that an array 
of researchers have  studied  new  utility functions  in an effort to address 
the dramatic failure of simple  log or power  utility models  to account for 
basic  features  of  asset  pricing  data.  Although  this  research  was  not 
explicitly motivated  by an effort to match correlations among  aggregate 
quantities,  the proposed  changes  in utility functions  might substantially 
alter important  dynamic  properties  of the  resulting  models,  including 
measures  of the welfare  effects  of interventions  or policy  experiments. 
Not  only  can security  data be informative  for macroeconomic  model- 
ing,  but macroeconomic  modeling  should  be also valuable  in interpret- 
ing the cross-sectional  and time-series  behavior  of asset returns. A large 
body  of empirical work  on  asset  pricing  aims  simply  at reducing  asset 
valuation  to the pricing of a relatively  small number  of "factors," with- 
out  explicit  reference  to  the  fundamental  sources  of  risk.  While  these 
dimensionality-reduction  exercises  can be quite useful  in some  contexts, 
it is difficult,  if not impossible,  to evaluate  the  significance  of apparent 
asset-pricing  anomalies  without  specifying  an  underlying  valuation 
model  that ties  asset  prices  to fundamental  features  of the  underlying 
economic  environment,  that is,  without  using  some  dynamic  economic 
model.  For example,  the  predictability  of  returns  is  only  an  anomaly 
given  evidence  that this  predictability  is at odds  with  the  times  series 
behavior  of  marginal  rates  of  substitution  or transformation.  Clearly, 
documentation  that  expected  returns  on  some  assets  vary  over  time 
"because"  the  expected  return  on  the  market or some  factor portfolio 
varies over time fails to address  this central issue. 
As emphasized  by Hansen  and  Richard (1987), stochastic  discount fac- 
tors provide  a convenient  vehicle  for summarizing  the  implications  of 
dynamic economic  models  for security market pricing. Alternative mod- 
els can imply differing stochastic  discount  factors. A primary aim of this 
paper  is  to characterize  the  properties  of the  discount  factors that are 
consistent  with  the  behavior  of asset  market payoffs  and  prices.  Such 
characterizations  are useful  for a variety  of reasons.  First, they  provide 
a common  set  of diagnostics  for a rich class  of models,  including  new 
models  that might be developed  in the future. Second,  they allow one to 
assess  readily the information  content  of new  financial data sets without 
recomputing  a  test  of  each  candidate  valuation  model.  Finally,  they 
provide  a general  way  of assessing  the magnitude  of asset-pricing  puz- 
zles. As  emphasized  by  Fama (1970,  1991),  almost  all of the  empirical 
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behavior  of  security  market  payoffs  and  prices  proceeds,  implicitly  or 
explicitly,  within  the context  of particular asset pricing models.  Charac- 
terizations  of stochastic  discount  factors that are consistent  with  poten- 
tially anomalous  security  market  data  provide  a more  flexible  way  of 
understanding  and interpreting  the empirical findings. 
The remainder  of this paper is organized  as follows.  We survey  Han- 
sen  and Jagannathan's  (1991) methods  for finding  feasible  regions  for 
means  and  standard  deviations  of stochastic  discount  factors. We then 
extend  these  characterizations  by  exploring  additional  features  of  dis- 
count  factors implied  by  security  market  data.  For instance,  uncondi- 
tional volatility  in  discount  factors  can be  attributed  to  either  average 
conditional  volatility  or to variability in conditional  means.  We provide 
a characterization  of  this  tradeoff  as  implied  by  security  market data. 
We also quantify the sense  in which  candidate  discount  factors (implied 
by specific models)  must be more volatile  when  they are less  correlated 
with  security  market returns.  We then  apply  these  characterizations  to 
reexamine  a variety of stochastic  discount  factor models  that have been 
proposed  in  the  literature.  Taken  together,  these  exercises  constitute 
Sections  2 and 3 of our paper. 
In Section 4 we  follow  He and Modest  (1991) and Luttmer (1991) and 
investigate  the  effects  of  market  frictions  on  the  implications  of  asset 
market data for analogs  to stochastic  discount  factors.  He and  Modest 
(1991) and Luttmer (1991) have  considered  a variety of frictions such as 
short-sale  constraints,  bid/ask  spreads  or transactions  costs,  and  bor- 
rowing  constraints.  Not  surprisingly,  these  market imperfections  tend 
to loosen the link between  asset  returns  and  marginal rates of substitu- 
tion and transformation.  However,  they  do not eliminate  this link, and 
asset  returns  still  provide  useful  information  for  dynamic  economic 
models.  We focus  exclusively  on borrowing  constraints  because  of the 
attention these imperfections  have received in the macroeconomics  liter- 
ature and because  of their potential  importance  in welfare  analyses. 
2. Interpreting  Asset Market  Data using the Frictionless 
Market  Paradigm 
To assess  the  implications  of  asset  market  data  for economic  models 
and  to  discuss  asset  pricing  anomalies,  one  needs  some  conceptual 
framework  or paradigm.  The frictionless  market paradigm  is by far the 
most  commonly  used  framework,  because  it provides  a conceptually 
simple  and convenient  benchmark.  Of course,  it is easy  to be critical of 
frictionless  markets.  Several remarks come  to mind  under  the heading, 
"the real world  is complicated."  Obviously,  asset  markets do not func- 118 *  COCHRANE  & HANSEN 
tion exactly as described  by this paradigm.  At some  level  of inspection, 
market  frictions  such  as  transaction  costs,  short  sale,  and  borrowing 
constraints  must  be  important.  Later in this  essay,  we  will  have  more 
to say about market frictions.  But a better understanding  of the implica- 
tions of asset market data viewed  through  the frictionless  markets para- 
digm  is a valuable  (and  perhaps  necessary)  precursor  to assessing  the 
importance  of financial market imperfections. 
2.1 STOCHASTIC  DISCOUNT  FACTORS 
Many frictionless-market  empirical analyses  are conducted  with  the ad- 
ditional straitjacket of tightly specified  models,  featuring consumers  that 
aggregate  to known,  simple  utility  functions.  Among  other things,  ag- 
gregation  typically  requires  that consumers  engage  in a substantial  de- 
gree  of risk pooling.  Decisive  empirical  evidence  obtained  within  this 
straitjacket is  easily  misconstrued  as  evidence  against  the  frictionless- 
market paradigm  itself.  The points  of this subsection  are: (1) to empha- 
size that, as long  as there are no arbitrage opportunities,  we can always 
interpret  asset  market  data  through  the  frictionless-market  paradigm; 
and  (2) to show  that the  observable  implications  of frictionless-market 
asset  pricing models  can be conveniently  understood  by characterizing 
the stochastic  discount factors through  which  such  models  generate  asset 
price predictions. 
We begin  by  developing  the  frictionless-markets  paradigm  in a now 
and then economy.'  Trading in securities  markets takes place in the now 
time  period,  and  payoffs  to  holding  these  securities  are received  in  a 
subsequent  then time period.  A payoff to a security is a random variable 
or equivalently  a bundle of  contingent  claims  in  the  then time  period. 
Consumers/investors  in this economy  can form portfolios  of securities, 
without  transactions  costs,  short sale constraints,  or other impediments 
to trade. 
The Principle of No-Arbitrage  follows  when  consumers  are not satiated 
in the  then time  period.  Because  consumers  always  want  more  of  the 
numeraire good,  any portfolio  with  a payoff  that is always  nonnegative 
and  sometimes  positive  must  have  a positive  price.  Equivalently,  any 
claim  contingent  on  an  event  that  might  occur  must  have  a positive 
price. 
The  Principle  of  No-Arbitrage  implies  that  alternative  ways  of  con- 
structing the  same  payoff  must  have  the  same  cost or price,  as long  as 
there is a nontrivial,  nonnegative  portfolio  payoff.  Thus,  the  Principle 
1. Our formulation  closely follows the formulations  of Ross (1976), Harrison  and Kreps 
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of No-Arbitrage  implies  that  each  portfolio  payoff  must  have  a unique 
price, that is,  we  obtain the Law of One Price. 
Consumers/investors  can purchase  a claim to a linear combination  of 
any two  security  market payoffs  by simply  purchasing  the correspond- 
ing linear combination  of the securities.  The unique  assignment  of prices 
to portfolio  payoffs  must  inherit  this  linearity.  Thus,  we  can  think  of 
asset pricing in arbitrage-free frictionless-markets  as a linear pricing  func- 
tional that maps  the space of asset payoffs  (then) into prices (now) on the 
real line. 
How  can we  think about testing the frictionless-market  paradigm? We 
could look for two  portfolios  with  the same payoffs,  but different prices 
(i.e.,  we could test the Law of One Price), or we  could look for a portfolio 
with a nonnegative  and nontrivial  payoff with  a nonpositive  price (i.e., 
test the Principle of No-Arbitrage).  The detection  of pure arbitrage oppor- 
tunities  is seldom  the aim of empirical work on asset  prices,  and conse- 
quently  empirical researchers  typically  look at security market data sets 
that do not imply  direct violations  of the Principle of No-Arbitrage.  For 
such  data sets,  we  can always use  the  frictionless  markets paradigm  as 
an interpretive  device.  Equivalently,  we  will be able to find  a stochastic 
discount factor that  will  correctly  price  all  of  the  observed  portfolio 
payoffs. 
As  an  example,  suppose  we  use  data  on  n primitive  payoffs  in  an 
econometric  analysis.  For example,  we  may  use  data on  the  measured 
one-period  returns  on  n assets.  Stack these  payoffs  into  an  n-dimen- 
sional random  vector x with  a finite  second  moment.  A common  space 
P of payoffs  to  use  in  econometric  analyses  of  such  assets  consists  of 
constant-weighted  portfolios  of the primitive  payoffs: 
P =  p: p =  c  x for some c E  n},  (2.1) 
where  c is  a vector  of  portfolio  weights.  Let the  vector  q  denote  the 
prices  of the  original  payoff  vector  x. When  all of the  original  security 
payoffs  are converted  into  returns,  q is a vector  of ones.  We can then 
construct  a candidate  price of a portfolio  payoff,  say c ? x,  from prices 
of the original n payoffs  via: 
rr(C x) =  c  q.  (2.2) 
The Law of One  Price is  simply  the  implication  that this  price assign- 
ment  depends  only  on the payoff  c ? x itself and not necessarily  on the 
choice  of c used  to construct  this payoff.  If E(xx') is nonsingular,  there 
is only  one  portfolio  weight  that achieves  any  attainable payoff.  Thus, 120  ?  COCHRANE  & HANSEN 
the Law of One Price is trivially satisfied. Clearly, the use of formula 
(2.2) to assign prices to payoffs implies that the pricing  functional Tr  will 
be linear on P. 
A stochastic  discount  factor  is any random  variable  y that correctly  repre- 
sents the prices of payoffs via the formula: 
?r(p) =  E(yp) for all p in P.  (2.3) 
The name is motivated by the fact that y is used to discount  payoffs 
differently  in alternative states of the world. Using the familiar  covari- 
ance decomposition: cov(y, p)  =  E(yp) -  E(y)E(p), equation (2.3) is 
equivalent to 
Tr(p)  =  E(y)E(p) +  cov(y, p).  (2.4) 
The first term on the right side of equation (2.4) uses E(y) to discount 
the mean payoff, and the second term adjusts for the riskiness of the 
payoff. 
The Riesz Representation  Theorem guarantees the existence of a sto- 
chastic discount factor as long as the Law of One Price is satisfied. For 
our example, it is easy to construct a stochastic discount factor  y: 
y* =  x'E(xx')-lq.  (2.5) 
This is not the only discount factor, however. For instance, choose any 
random variable  e for which E(ex) =  0. Then y* + e also is a stochastic 
discount factor. Define Q to be the family of all stochastic discount 
factors, that is, the family of all random variables with finite second 
moments that satisfy (2.3). 
One theoretical  device for generating  a stochastic  discount factor  from 
an underlying model is to use the implied intertemporal  marginal  rate 
of substitution of consumers in the model economy. For instance, this 
is the device used in consumption-based or utility-based asset pricing 
theory. With a time-separable power utility function, the consumers' 
first-order  conditions imply that equation (2.3) is satisfied for a "candi- 
date" stochastic discount factor given by the marginal  rate of substitu- 
tion m: 
u' (Cthen) 
m  =  p  =  P(Cthen/cnow)-  (2.6) 
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where  u(c) =  [cl'  -  1]/(1  -  -y)  is the one-period  power  utility function, 
y  -  0,  and  3 >  0  is  a  subjective  discount  factor.  Hence,  if  accurate 
consumption  data  are  available,  the  observable  implications  of  this 
model  specification  are that  m is  in  the  set  QJ  of admissible  stochastic 
discount  factors. 
Utility-based  models  typically generate  strictly positive  candidates  for 
stochastic  discount  factors.  For example,  in equation  (2.6),  u'(Cnow)  >  0 
and u'(cthen)  >  0 imply  m >  0. More generally,  Kreps (1981) and Clark 
(1990) show  that under  the Principle of No-Arbitrage,  there will gener- 
ally exist a strictly positive stochastic  discount  factor. With this in mind, 
we  let `  + + denote  the  subset  of  J consisting  of all stochastic  discount 
factors that are strictly positive.  Any  of these  discount  factors could  be 
used  to assign  arbitrage-free prices to derivative  claims formed from pay- 
offs  in P or formed  from  other  payoffs  traded  by  consumers.  Equiva- 
lently,  they  could  be  used  to  assign  positive  prices  to  any  nontrivial 
event-contingent  claim in the  then time period.  Therefore,  utility-based 
models  often  lead to a model-based  way  of constructing  a strictly posi- 
tive candidate  m in the  set 9 + +. 
The  stochastic  discount  factor given  in equation  (2.5) might  well  be 
negative  with  positive  probability  depending  on  the  covariance  struc- 
ture of the primitive payoffs  and might not be in 09  +  +. Similarly, incom- 
plete market models  such as the familiar Capital Asset  Pricing Model of 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin  (1968) and linear factor mod- 
els  as  suggested  by  Ross  (1976)  and  Connor  (1984) imply  candidate 
stochastic discount  factors that need  not be strictly positive.  The Capital 
Asset  Pricing Model  implies  a candidate  discount  factor that is equal to 
a constant  minus  a scale multiple  of the return on the wealth  portfolio. 
More generally,  exact linear factor pricing models  imply  stochastic  dis- 
count  factors that are linear combinations  of the/an  underlying  collec- 
tion  of "factors," but  they  do  not  restrict these  linear combinations  to 
be  positive.  Hence,  whether  `J  or the  smaller  set  9 +  is the  relevant 
family of  stochastic  discount  factors depends  on  the  economic  models 
being  studied. 
2.2 MOMENT  IMPLICATIONS  FOR  DISCOUNT  FACTORS 
A large body  of empirical work in asset  pricing specifies  and tests mod- 
els  with  candidate  stochastic  discount  factors.  Given  a candidate  m, a 
chi-square  test is formed  using  the  sample  counterpart  to the  moment 
restriction: 
E(mx -  q)  =  0.  (2.7) 122 *  COCHRANE  & HANSEN 
For models  that imply a prespecified  parametric family of such m's, one 
conducts  the  test by minimizing  the  hypothetical  chi-square  value  and 
adjusting  the degrees  of freedom  according  to the number  of estimated 
parameters  (e.g.,  see  Brown  and  Gibbons,  1985; Cochrane,  1992a; Ep- 
stein and Zin, 1991; Hansen,  1982; Hansen  and Singleton,  1982; MacKin- 
lay and Richardson,  1991). 
This approach has been  partially successful  to date. However,  statisti- 
cal measures  of  fit such  as  a chi-square  test  statistic  may  not  provide 
the  most  useful  guide  to  the  modifications  that will  reduce  pricing  or 
other specification  errors. At times,  the parametric approach  looks  like 
a fishing  expedition  without  a well-articulated  strategy  for finding  the 
promising  fishing  holes.  Also,  application  of the  minimum  chi-square 
approach  to estimation  and  inference  sometimes  focuses  too  much  at- 
tention  on whether  a model  is perfectly specified  and not enough  atten- 
tion on assessing  model  performance. 
Hansen  and Jagannathan  (1991) suggested  a complementary  empiri- 
cal approach:  Instead  of  proposing  alternative  parametric models  and 
testing them,  begin  first by characterizing the set (J or Q + + of stochastic 
discount  factors consistent  with  asset  pricing data and  divorced  from a 
parametric specification. 
To review  the simplest  characterizations  obtained  by Hansen  and Ja- 
gannathan  (1991), we  study  a regression  of a discount  factor y onto  a 
constant  and  the  vector  x  of  asset  payoffs  observed  by  an  econome- 
trician 
y  =  a  +  x'b  +  e,  (2.8) 
where a is a constant  term, b is a vector of slope  coefficients,  and e is the 
regression  error. The standard  least-squares  formula for the regression 
coefficients  gives: 
b  [cov(x, x)]-lcov(x,  y)  (2.9) 
a  Ey -  Ex'b. 
Without direct data on the stochastic  discount  factor y, these  regression 
coefficients  cannot  be  estimated  in  the  usual  fashion.  Instead,  we  can 
exploit the fact that y must be a valid discount  factor to infer them.  The 
pricing relation  q  =  E(yx) implies 
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Substituting  equation (2.10) into equation (2.9), we obtain 
b  =  [cov(x, x)]-1  [q  -  E(y)E(x)].  (2.11) 
Hence, asset information  alone can be used to construct the regression 
coefficients b, given E(y). 
Because the right-hand side variables  of a regression are uncorrelated 
with residuals by construction, 
var(y)  =  var(x'b)  +  var(e).  (2.12) 
It follows that var(x'b)1/2  gives a lower bound on the standard  deviation 
of y. Thus, we have a lower bound on the standard deviation of all 
admissible  stochastic  discount factors  y in  J with the prespecified  mean, 
Ey. 
In our construction of a volatility bound, we considered the typical 
case in which no linear combination  of the vector x of asset payoffs used 
in an econometric analysis is identically equal to one, i.e.,  there is no 
real risk-free  interest rate. As a consequence, the price of a unit payoff 
is not known, and Ey cannot be inferred from the asset market data. 
Instead, we must calculate the lower bound on the standard deviation 
of y for each possible value of the mean. This computation leads to the 
lower envelope of the set of means and standard  deviations of admissi- 
ble discount factors (in  J), which we denote yS. 
2.3 ASSET  PRICING  PUZZLES 
Feasible regions for mean-standard deviation pairs of stochastic dis- 
count factors can be used to summarize asset  pricing  anomalies.  Figure 1 
plots two such regions. The regions were constructed using quarterly 
data on the real value-weighted NYSE portfolio and the 3-month Trea- 
sury-bill returns, from 1947 to 1990. In computing the boundaries of 
these regions, we approximated  population moments using their sam- 
ple counterparts.  To justify this use of time series data to approximate 
population moments, we presume that the now-and-then economy is 
replicated  in a stationary  fashion, at least asymptotically  (e.g., see Han- 
sen and Richard  1987). 
The cup-shaped region in Figure 1 shows  how  much volatility in 
stochastic discount factors is implied by two returns often used in em- 
pirical analyses of the utility-based intertemporal  asset pricing model. 
The minimum standard deviation of a discount factor y is about 0.25. 
Because the mean discount factor is near one,  and because discount 124 *  COCHRANE  & HANSEN 
Figure 1 BOUND ON THE  STANDARD  DEVIATION  OF STOCHASTIC 
DISCOUNT  FACTORS  AND EQUITY  PREMIUM  PUZZLE 
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Solid  line:  Minimum  standard deviation of discount factors  y that satisfy 1 =  E(yx) for given E(y), 
where x = value-weighted  NYSE  return  and Treasury  Bill  return.  Quarterly  data, 1947-1990. 
Dashed  line:  Bound calculated  from excess return,  value-weighted  NYSE  return  minus  T-bill  return. 
Triangles:  Mean and standard  deviation of marginal  rate of substitution  generated  by power utility, 
using quarterly  nondurable  and services  consumption  per capita, 
mt+, =  (Ct+l/Ct)-u  - 
factors have the units  of inverse  gross returns,  this is a substantial  stan- 
dard deviation.  Figure  1 also  shows  us  that  the  mean  discount  factor 
(equal  to  the  average  of  the  inverse  of  the  risk-free  return  if there  is 
one) must be very near 0.998,  unless  we  are willing  to accept a dramati- 
cally higher  standard  deviation  of the discount  factor. 
The boundary  of the  second  region  is depicted  by the dashed  line in 
Figure 1. This boundary  was computed  using  the excess return of stocks 
over bonds.  Hence,  it was constructed  with a single security payoff with 
a zero  price.  To differentiate  this  region  from the  initial return region, 
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ary of a feasible  region  for means  and  standard  deviations  constructed 
from  a vector  z  of  excess  returns  is  a ray from  the  origin  with  slope 
[Ez'cov(z, z)-1Ez]"2 for positive  values  of Ey. This slope is just the "price 
of risk" or the asymptotic  slope  of the mean-standard  deviation  for the 
asset market returns used  in an econometric  analysis.  When z is a scalar, 
as in our illustration,  the formula  for the  slope  collapses  to the ratio of 
the absolute  value  of the  mean  excess  return to its standard  deviation. 
Of course,  the  Equity-Premium  Region  2  always  contains  the  original 
return  region  Y; however,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  the  boundaries 
touch at one  point. 
It is not  readily  apparent  that the  region  Y (or for that matter 2)  is 
"puzzling."  Clearly, there exist stochastic  discount  factors that correctly 
price both  securities  on  average.  It only  makes  sense  to use  the  term 
puzzle once  we  have  narrowed  the  class  of  asset  valuation  models.  In 
other words,  we  cannot  say that the  volatility bounds for stochastic  dis- 
count factors are excessively  large without  knowing  how  large the vola- 
tility is of candidate  discount  factors implied  by particular models. 
For a point  of  reference,  and  as  a diagnostic  for a commonly  used 
model,  we  computed  sample  means  and  standard  deviations  implied 
by  representative  consumer  models  with  power  utility  functions.  The 
triangles in Figure 1 give  the mean-standard  deviation  pair for a candi- 
date  discount  factor m constructed  using  formula  (2.6)  and  aggregate 
quarterly  per  capita  nondurable  and  services  consumption  data  from 
1947 to  1990. These  calculations  assume  that  B =  1 and  the  indicated 
range  of  the  curvature  coefficients  y.  Alternative  choices  of  P can  be 
inferred by making proportional  shifts in the means and standard devia- 
tions. 
Our statement  of  the  Equity-Premium  Puzzle is  that  curvature  coeffi- 
cients  y of at least 40 are required  to generate  the variance  of discount 
factors implied  by the equity-premium  region  2  (for the triangles  to lie 
over  the  dashed  line).  Furthermore,  even  if  we  are willing  to  admit 
curvature coefficients  of 40 or more,  the resulting  mean-standard  devia- 
tion  pairs  still  do  not  lie  in  the  cup  because  of  their  low  means  (the 
candidates  have  means  Em <  .85). Recall that Em is the predicted  aver- 
age  price  of  a unit  payoff.  When  the  riskless  return  is  equal  to  this 
average,  the riskfree rate is in excess  of 17% per quarter. In effect,  there 
is more than just an Equity-Premium  Puzzle, but also a Riskfree-Rate  Puzzle 
(see also Weil,  1989).2 
2. Kocherlakota  (1990) argued that increasing the subjective discount factor to values 
greater  than one is not implausible  and can be consistent with existence of equilibrium 
in a growing economy with infinitely  lived consumers. Increasing 3 helps to "resolve" 
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These  statements  of the  puzzles  do  not involve  the  specific  assump- 
tions  of  the  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985)  model,  including  a  two-state 
Markov approximation  to  the  distribution  of consumption  growth,  an 
endowment  economy,  the  identification  of a stock  index  as a claim to 
aggregate  consumption,  use  of Treasury bills as a proxy for a real risk- 
free bond,  etc. They are not specific  to this particular set of assets,3 nor 
to postwar data. Thus, our formulation  suggests  that attempts to resolve 
the  puzzle  by  allowing  levered  equity,  accounting  for  the  monetary 
mispricing  of Treasury bills,  or permitting  a more general Markov struc- 
ture for the endowment  shock  are not likely to be productive. 
2.4 STATISTICAL  INFERENCES 
In our discussion  so  far, we  have  treated  sample  moments  as if they 
were  equal  to  the  underlying  population  moments.  That  is,  we  ab- 
stracted from sampling  error. It is interesting  to know  whether  the Equi- 
ty-Premium  Puzzle and the Riskfree-Rate  Puzzle still have content  once we 
account  for sampling  error. To answer  this question,  we  use  statistical 
methods  proposed  by Hansen,  Heaton,  and Jagannathan  (1992). In the 
nonparametric  spirit of this  exercise,  we  use  large sample  central limit 
approximations  in making  probability  assessments. 
To test  whether  sampling  error can  account  for the  violation  of  the 
volatility bounds,  it is convenient  to derive  equivalent  second  moment 
bounds.  Note  that  the  orthogonality  of  the  regression  residual  to  the 
right-hand  side variables in the regression  implies  that the random vari- 
able  a  +  b'x  must  satisfy  the  pricing  formula  (2.3)  and,  hence,  is  a 
stochastic discount  factor in  J. For a prespecified  mean Ey, a +  b'x also 
must assign  a price Ey to a unit payoff.  Combining  these  equations,  we 
have  that 
E  1  [1x]  a-  Ey  .  (2.13) 
lX_  -b  q 
By premultiplying  equation  (2.13) by the  row  vector  [a, b'],  we  obtain 
the following  formula for the  second  moment  of a  +  x'b: 
E[(a + x'b)2] =[Eyq']  b  (2.14) 
3. Formally,  one gets roughly similar  bounds even if one does not use Treasury-bill  data, 
because many other sets of assets imply about the same slope of the mean-standard 
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This  formula  turns  out  to  be  quite  useful  for  econometric  inference, 
because  it says that the second  moment  bound  is just a linear combina- 
tion of the regression  coefficients. 
Given a candidate  discount  factor m, we  combine  relations  (2.13) and 
(2.14) into a composite  set of moment  restrictions: 
E{1  [  x] 
a 
-  }  =0  (2.15) 
E{[mq']  _m2  0.O 
For instance,  m might be constructed  via the power utility formula (2.6). 
The first set  of moment  implications  requires  that a  +  x'b  have  mean 
Em and  correctly  price  the  payoffs  q.  The  last  moment  inequality  re- 
quires that the candidate  m satisfies  the  second  moment  bound  associ- 
ated  with  Em.  In  contrast  to  the  moment  restrictions  (2.7),  the 
restrictions (2.15) do not require the candidate  m to price assets  correctly 
on average. 
As  is  clear  from  our  previous  discussion,  the  parameters  a and  b 
can be  identified  and  estimated  using  only  the  moment  conditions  in 
equation  (2.13).  We use  such  estimates  to approximate  the  asymptotic 
covariance  matrix for the  composite  moment  relations  in (2.15) and  to 
account  for  sampling  variability  when  testing  inequality  (2.14).45  Be- 
cause  of the  one-sided  nature  of the  restriction,  the  probability values 
of the resulting  test statistics  are one-half  those  of a chi-square  random 
variable with  one  degree  of freedom. 
In Table 1 we  present  results for the Volatility Test just described.  We 
report  test  statistics  obtained  using  the  two  original  returns  (value- 
weighted  NYSE and  Treasury bill) and  using  the  single  excess  return. 
The first group  of test statistics  pertains  to the original region  YS,  while 
4. This strategy is very similar  to one proposed by Burnside (1991)  and Cecchetti, Lam, 
and Mark  (1992). 
5. From  Hansen (1982)  we know that the asymptotic  covariance  matrix  can be interpreted 
as a spectral  density matrix  at frequency zero. In our empirical  analysis, we followed 
Newey and West (1987)  and used Bartlett  weights to estimate this density matrix.  To 
implement the volatility  test, we transformed  the sample counterparts  to the moment 
conditions using a lower triangular  decomposition  of an estimate of the inverse of the 
asymptotic  covariance  matrix.  The last transformed  moment condition  should hold with 
an inequality. We obtain our test statistic by minimizing the quadratic  form in the 
transformed  moment conditions by choice of a and b where the last moment condition 
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Table 1  VOLATILITY  TESTS  USING T-BILL  AND VALUE-WEIGHTED 
RETURNS 
Returns  Excess  returns 
y  Statistic  p-value  Statistic  p-value 
1  2.19  .069  2.68  .051 
5  4.93  .013  2.43  .060 
10  4.90  .013  1.47  .113 
15  4.76  .014  0.75  .193 
20  4.61  .016  0.36  .274 
30  4.30  .019  0.05  .412 
40  3.99  .023  0.00  .500 
50  3.66  .027  0.00  .500 
The Volatility  Test is a test of the moment conditions 
E{[x]  [1  lx  []  L  =  and  E{[m  q'] []  -  m2} 
where m = (Cthen/C,ow)-y  and x = value-weighted  NYSE  and T-bill  returns.  The asymptotic  covariance 
matrix  was estimated  by weighting autocovariance  j with the Bartlett  weight (T-  [j|)/T  for Ijl < T and 
adding.  The results  reported  are for T =  10.6 
the second  group pertains to the equity premium region 2.  As is evident 
from Table 1, sampling  error does  not appear to be the explanation  for 
the puzzles displayed  in Figure 1.7 In comparing  the two columns  of test 
statistics in Table 1, recall that raising y increases volatility of the implied 
discount  factors  but  has  an  adverse  effect  on  the  mean.  The  adverse 
mean  effect  is  evident  in  test  statistics  based  on  the  two  returns  but 
absent  in  the  test  statistics  constructed  using  only  the  excess  return. 
Interestingly,  the  smallest  probability  value  for the  return-based  tests 
occurs at y  =  1. 
Table 2 reports  a chi-square  test  of the  pricing  relation  (2.7).  We in- 
6. The magnitude  of the  test  statistics  turned  out  to be  sensitive  to the  choice  of T. We 
also tried values  of T  =  5, 15, and 20. In the case of y  =  1, the test statistics range from 
1.63 to 2.72 when  both returns were  used  and from 2.21 to 2.79 when  the single  excess 
return was used.  In the case of  y =  50, the test statistics ranged from 4.63 to 2.69 when 
both returns were  used.  Overall,  the test based  on both returns turned out to be more 
sensitive  to the  choice  of T as might  be expected  because  of the  serial dependence  in 
the real T-bill return. 
7. When  m is constant,  the limiting  distribution  no longer  applies  because  the only  solu- 
tion  to  the  moment  conditions  is  a  =  m and  b  =  0.  Hence,  for m's with  very  low 
variation  (values  of  y near zero),  the  performance  of the  volatility  test  statistic  might 
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clude  this Pricing-Error Test for the  sake of comparison  and to empha- 
size  that  volatility  bounds  are not a substitute  for directly  testing  the 
pricing implications  of a model.  It is necessary  that a correctly specified 
asset  pricing model  satisfy  the bounds,  but not sufficient.  The point  of 
the Volatility Tests is to assess  whether  the volatility bounds  are robust 
to sampling  error. For this particular data set,  the two sets of test statis- 
tics  seem  to  convey  very  similar  messages,  although  the  probability 
values  tend  to be smaller for the Pricing-Error Tests. 
2.5 INCORPORATING  POSITIVITY 
As we  discussed  previously,  the  Principle  of No-Arbitrage  implies  the 
existence  of a strictly positive  stochastic  discount  factor. Furthermore, 
utility-based  candidate  discount  factors are strictly positive  by construc- 
tion.  For these  reasons,  it is interesting  to look  at volatility  bounds  for 
positive  stochastic discount  factors (or, more conveniently,  for nonnega- 
tive stochastic discount  factors). Unfortunately,  we can no longer appeal 
to  least-squares  regression  theory  to  derive  these  bounds.  However, 
there  is a useful  representation  result  that  can be  applied  instead.  As 
long as (rr, P) satisfies  the Principle of No-Arbitrage,  Hansen  and Jagan- 
nathan  (1991) showed  that there exists  a payoff  p* in P such  that 
rT(p)  =  E[max{p*, O}p] for all p in P.  (2.16) 
Table  2  PRICING-ERROR  TESTS  USING T-BILL  AND VALUE-WEIGHTED 
RETURNS 
Returns  Excess  returns 
X2(2)  p-value  X2(1)  p-value 
1  17.65  <.001  10.30  .001 
5  58.20  <.001  5.51  .002 
10  62.92  <.001  6.83  .009 
15  61.87  <.001  4.38  .036 
20  59.97  <.001  2.79  .094 
30  55.61  <.001  1.26  .262 
40  51.04  <.001  0.66  .417 
50  46.46  <.001  0.38  .537 
The Pricing-Error Test is a test of the moment  conditions 
E(mx) =  q 
where  m  =  (cthen/now,)-  and  x  =  value-weighted  NYSE  and  T-bill returns.  We  used  the  sample 
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Thus, the pricing functional nT  can always be represented using an op- 
tion on a payoff in P with a zero strike price. Clearly, max{p*,  0} is a 
nonnegative random variable. Hansen and Jagannathan  (1991)  verified 
that this also has the smallest second moment among nonnegative sto- 
chastic discount factors. 
This representation  leads to a characterization  of the feasible region, 
9y+, of mean-standard  deviations for nonnegative discount factors. To 
apply it, we add a unit payoff to P and make up alternative  prices for 
that payoff. Specifying a price for a unit payoff is equivalent  to assigning 
a mean to y.  This assignment is not arbitrary  because the arbitrage 
bounds from the literature  on options pricing  impose limits on the range 
of possible prices of a unit payoff consistent with the absence of arbi- 
trage opportunities (see Hansen and Jagannathan,  1991, for details). For 
each price assignment within these bounds, we find the option on a 
payoff in the augmented space that satisfies the counterpart  to equation 
(2.16). The lower envelope of 9 + is constructed  by computing the stan- 
dard deviations of each such option. 
Figure 2 gives a comparison of the boundaries of regions 9f and Y+, 
without and with positivity, constructed using the real value-weighted 
and T-bill returns as in Figure 2. Notice that the boundaries agree for 
ranges of Ey for which the volatility bounds are small. Once the volatil- 
ity bounds get larger than about 0.7, the boundaries start to depart. 
This pattern is easy to explain: as the standard deviation of y, whose 
mean is near one, rises past 0.7, the frontier  y's in %  are more likely to 
be negative in some states of the world and, hence, omitted from 9 +  +. 
As one might therefore  expect, this pattern  is quite common across data 
sets on various assets. Hence, exploiting nonnegativity tends to be an 
important refinement when  the original volatility bounds (for 0i)  are 
already quite substantial. 
The vertical  lines in Figure 2 are used to denote the upper and lower 
arbitrage  bounds on the mean of y. By eliminating discount factors  that 
are negative in some states of the world, we gain considerably more 
information about the means of the remaining nonnegative discount 
factors. Where before we could only quantify a dramatic  increase in the 
standard deviation of discount factors associated with mean discount 
factors  far from 0.998, now we can rule  out mean discount factors  below 
about 0.98 or above 1.03. In this way, positivity makes the Riskfree-Rate 
Puzzle more dramatic. 
Finally, for this particular  data set, the corresponding excess return 
region S + coincides with the original excess return region 3.  Conse- 
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2.6 LENGTHENING  THE  INVESTMENT  HORIZON 
Next we  explore  the sensitivity  of our findings  to the "investment  hori- 
zon" between  the now and then periods.  In the calculations  reported  so 
far, we  used  quarterly  data  with  returns  measured  over  the  quarter. 
Hence,  the  investment  horizon  coincided  with  the  sampling  interval. 
We  now  expand  the  investment  horizon  to be  1 year,  2 years,  and  5 
years. We have (at least) three reasons  for doing this. First, other empiri- 
cal investigations  have  focused  on  annual  data  to  incorporate  prewar 
data  (e.g.,  see  Grossman  and  Shiller,  1981; Hansen  and  Jagannathan, 
1991; Mehra and Prescott,  1985). By including  annual  investment  hori- 
zons,  we  will facilitate comparisons  to that previous  work.  Second,  us- 
ing  widely  separated  quarterly  consumption  data  to  measure  a 
long-horizon  marginal  rate  of  substitution  may  mitigate  time- 
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Solid  line:  Volatility  bound generated  by real value-weighted  NYSE  and T-bill  returns. 
Dashed  line:  Bound on the standard  deviation of nonnegative  discount factors  generated  by real value- 
weighted NYSE  and T-bill  returns. 
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aggregation  biases.  Finally, to help think about solutions  to asset pricing 
puzzles,  it may be useful  to assess  whether  these  puzzles  are less  pro- 
nounced  at longer  horizons. 
Figure 3 reports the regions  for 1-, 2-, and 5-year horizons  along with 
the  previously  reported  quarterly  horizon.  The  asset  return  data  are 
compounded  quarterly value-weighted  NYSE and T-bill returns.  All re- 
gions  include  the positivity  restriction. 
Discount  factors at different investment  horizons  are different objects, 
so we  expect  the feasible  regions  for means  and standard deviations  to 
be altered as we change  horizon.  A two-period  stochastic discount  factor 
is a product of two consecutive  one-period  discount  factors, so we might 
expect  the  mean  of  a  two-period  discount  factor to  be  lower  and  its 
variance to be higher  than that of a one-period  discount  factor. As seen 
in Figure 4,  the  bottom  of the  mean-standard  deviation  frontier shifts 
up  and  to  the  left  as  we  increase  the  investment  horizon.  While  the 
volatility  implications  of  the  long-horizon  returns  are more  dramatic, 
Figure  3 VOLATILITY  BOUNDS FOR  LONG-HORIZON  RETURNS 
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Each line gives the volatility bound on nonnegative discount factors generated by the real value- 
weighted NYSE  and T-bill  returns at the indicated horizon. Long-horizon  returns  are computed by 
compounding quarterly returns. 
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Each line  gives  the  volatility  bound  on  nonnegative  discount  factors  generated  by  the  real  value- 
weighted  NYSE and  T-bill returns  at the  indicated  horizon.  Long-horizon  returns  are computed  by 
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there  is  less  information  about  the  mean  of  longer  horizon  discount 
factors, as reflected  by the horizontal  expansion  of the regions. 
In  Figure  4  we  report  the  two  extreme  boundaries  (quarterly  and 
five-year investment  horizons)  together  with  the mean-standard  devia- 
tion  pairs for the  candidate  discount  factors  constructed  using  power 
utility functions.  Figure 4 extends  the range of the power  y beyond  the 
values  explored  in Figure 1. Note  that there now  is a value of the power 
at which  the quarterly candidates  enter the region.  However,  the power 
is extreme,  y -  210.  One  possible  reason  for entertaining  large values 
of  y follows  from the  work  of Constantinides  and  Duffie  (1991). They 
gave  an illustration  of a model  with  incomplete  markets  in which  the 
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Solid  lines:  Volatility  bounds calculated  from one-quarter  and 5-year real value-weighted  NYSE  and 
T-bill  returns,  as in Figure  3. 
Lines  with  triangles:  Mean and standard  deviation  of marginal  rates  of substitution  generated  by power 
utility, 
mt+k  =  (Ct+k/ct)-  , 
k =  1 (quarterly), k =  4 (1 year),  k =  8 (2 year) and k =  20 (5 year).  Symbols  plotted  at y increments 
of 10. 
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implied power  for the aggregate  intertemporal  marginal rate of substitu- 
tion is a mongrel  of the underlying  preference  parameter and the param- 
eters  governing  heterogeneity  in  the  endowments  across  individuals. 
In their illustration,  large values  of  y need  not reflect high values  of the 
curvature parameters  in the  individual  preferences.  (See also Mankiw, 
1986, and Scheinkman,  1989, for similar observations.) 
Raising consumption  ratios to extremely large negative  powers  results 
in large measures  of marginal rates of substitution  when  the consump- 
tion  ratios  are less  than  one.  In effect,  large  values  of  y  magnify  the 
effect of "bad events"  for the  purposes  of asset  pricing  (see  also Rietz, 
1988).  The  mean  of  the  power  utility  candidates  (triangles)  starts  to 
increase when  these negative  growth rate observations  start to dominate 
the sample moments  of m. Because the sample  moments  are dominated 
by a few  data points,  the  calculations  for large values  of  y may  reflect 
very poor  estimates  of the population  moments.  For this reason,  inter- 
preting  our large y results  may be treacherous. 
As  the investment  horizon  increases,  the  Equity-Premium  and  Risk- 
free-Rate  Puzzles  do  not  vanish,  but  instead  appear  to  be  more  pro- 
nounced.  For  instance,  larger  values  of  y  are  required  to  enter  the 
feasible  regions.  This  occurs  because  there  are fewer  and  fewer  con- 
sumption  growth  observations  less  than one  at longer horizons.8  In the 
extreme  case  of a 5-year investment  horizon,  the mean  discount  factor 
always  declines  as  y  increases,  and  the  standard  deviation  never  ap- 
proaches  the  bounds.  In  this  case,  there  are  no  5-year  consumption 
ratios that are less  than one in our sample.  Of course,  the sample  infor- 
mation for the longer  investment  horizons  is likely to be quite weak. 
In comparing  1-year investment  horizon  results  to  those  of Hansen 
and Jagannathan  (1991), the  postwar  data used  in constructing  Figure 
5 looks  more puzzling  because  of  the  absence  of  the  depression  data 
points  with  pronounced  negative  consumption  growth  rates. These  ex- 
tra prewar  data points  dramatically  increase  the  standard  deviation  of 
the  model-based  candidate  discount  factors.  The turning  point  for the 
1-year "triangle" curve occurs at y  = 15, and the 1-year discount  factors 
enter the region  at -y  30 when  prewar data is included. 
2.7 USING CONDITIONAL  INFORMATION  TO DECOMPOSE 
UNCONDITIONAL  VARIATION 
The  predictability  of  returns  is  another  apparent  puzzle  that  has  re- 
ceived  a lot  of  attention  in  the  finance  literature  (see  Fama,  1991,  for 
a review).  For this  reason,  we  follow  Hansen  and  Richard  (1987) by 
8. The number  of negative  consumption  growth  rate observations  in our sample  is 33 for 
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introducing  formally conditioning  information  into our setup.  Let '6 de- 
note a conditioning  information  set available to economic  agents  and to 
econometricians  in the  now period,  which  naturally includes  the prices 
of securities.9 Asset  prices must  obey 
q  =  E(yxl|I).  (2.17) 
There  are  a  variety  of  ways  in  which  we  can  exploit  conditioning 
information in W6.  For instance,  conditioning  information  can be used  to 
sharpen the unconditional  volatility bounds.  Alternatively,  conditioning 
information  can  be  used  to  split  the  unconditional  variance  into  two 
components:  the  average  conditional  variance  and  the  variance  of the 
conditional  mean: 
var(y)  =  E[var(yJl6)] +  var[E(yj 6)].  (2.18) 
If returns were  unpredictable,  all unconditional  variance would  be due 
to conditional  variance,  and none  to variation in the conditional  mean. 
Knowledge  of the split between  the two  components  would  help  us to 
understand  better  the  information  in  asset  market  data  about  condi- 
tional moments  of the  stochastic  discount  factors. 
Asset  market  data  turns  out  to  contain  information  about  how  to 
make this  split in variance.  In light of relation  (2.18),  this split also has 
implications  for the  unconditional  variance  of stochastic  discount  factors 
implied by the conditional  moments  of asset returns.  We describe briefly 
how to form feasible regions for the pair {E[var(y  I6)],  var[E(y  l6)]}.  More 
details are provided  in Appendix  1. First, we  use  the fact that any y on 
the  {E[var(yJlC)],  var[E(yl1S)]} frontier  must  also  be  on  the  conditional 
(on '6) mean-standard  deviation  frontier for y.  If not,  one  could  lower 
conditional  variance with  no effect  on conditional  mean.  Gallant, Han- 
sen,  and Tauchen (1990) provided  a two-(conditional)  dimensional  char- 
acterization  of the  latter frontier.  Using  their characterization,  we  find 
the frontier for {E[var(y I  6)], var[E(y l6)]}  by solving  a constrained  mini- 
mization  problem: choose  a y on the conditional  mean-standard  devia- 
tion frontier to minimize  E[var(y l')]  given  var[E(yl'6)]. 
To compute  such  frontiers,  we  need  a model  of the first and  second 
conditional  moments  of asset  returns and the candidates.  Our model  is 
formed from regressions  of the log returns  and log consumption  ratios 
on the value-weighted  dividend/price  ratio, the lagged  log T-bill return, 
and the term premium.  For simplicity,  we assume  the conditional  covar- 
iance  matrix for log  returns  and  log  consumption  growth  is  constant, 
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and  estimate  it as the  residual  covariance  matrix in the  forecasting  re- 
gression.  We then  infer the  first two  conditional  moments  of the  levels 
of consumption  growth  and  returns  assuming  lognormality.  (Incorpo- 
rating  more  sophisticated  models  of  conditional  heteroskedasticity  or 
more  flexible  laws  of motion  might  lead  to valuable  improvements  on 
these  calculations.) 
Figure 5 presents  our results.  Notice  that most  of the  unconditional 
variance  of  discount  factors  comes  from  conditional  variance;  only  a 
narrow  range  of  variation  in  the  conditional  mean  discount  factor is 
consistent  with  the  data.  This makes  sense,  because  the real return on 
Treasury-bills is nearly riskless  and is nearly constant  over time.  Also, 
notice  that  the  unconditional  standard  deviation  bound  for  discount 
Figure  5 CONDITIONAL  MOMENT  BOUNDS 
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factors is about .38, which  is higher than the bound  of about .24 that we 
encountered  previously.  The reason for the increase in the bound  is that 
we  have  now  incorporated  conditioning  information  embedded  in the 
conditional  first and  second  moments  of returns to sharpen  the uncon- 
ditional volatility  bounds  as in Gallant,  Hansen,  and Tauchen  (1990). 
Figure  5  also  includes  the  corresponding  conditioning  information 
decomposition  for power  utility functions.  For low  values  of the power 
y,  the candidate  discount  factors have  about  the  right predictability  of 
conditional means,  but only slight predictability is required (or allowed). 
However,  these  discount  factors do not have enough  conditional  volatil- 
ity  on  average.  As  the  curvature  rises,  the  conditional  variation  in- 
creases,  but  the  unconditional  volatility  attributed  to  the  conditional 
mean becomes  too extreme.  Thus,  the models  predict dramatically too 
much variation in the price of a unit payoff (the reciprocal of the riskfree 
return). 
The solid square in Figure 5 gives  the volatility  split for the reciprocal 
of  the  value-weighted  return  on  the  NYSE.  This  candidate  m can  be 
justified  under  an  assumption  of  logarithmic  utility  where  the  value- 
weighted  return is used  as a measure  of the return on the wealth  portfo- 
lio  (see  Rubinstein,  1976,  and  Epstein  and  Zin,  1991). This  candidate 
also  suffers  from too  much  variation  in  the  conditional  mean  and  too 
little conditional  variation  (on average). 
2.8 OTHER  PUZZLES 
Despite  the  widespread  attention  the  Equity-Premium Puzzle  has  re- 
ceived,  other data sets can imply much sharper restrictions on the family 
of feasible  stochastic  discount  factors.  Hansen  and Jagannathan  (1991) 
found  dramatic bounds  implied  by quarterly holding-period  returns on 
Treasury-bills of varying  maturity.  Knez (1991) found  a Default-Premium 
Puzzle, sharp bounds  implied  by a data set that includes  corporate and 
government  bounds  of  similar  maturity.  In both  cases,  the  apparent 
presence  of  near  arbitrage  opportunities-highly  correlated  returns 
with  similar standard  deviations  and  slightly  different  means-makes 
the bounds  dramatic, especially  when  positivity  is incorporated.  Bekaert 
and Hodrick (1992) found  sharp volatility bounds  for stochastic discount 
factors implied  by security payoffs  and prices constructed  from data on 
foreign  exchange  and  international  equity  markets.  Cochrane  (1992b) 
constructed  volatility  bounds  implied  by  a  linearized  present  value 
model.  In addition,  these  techniques  can elegantly  address many empir- 
ical questions  relating to traditional factor pricing models  in finance.  For 
example,  Snow  (1991) recast the  Small Firm Effect  as set of implications 
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3. Other  Candidate  Discount  Factors 
The equity premium  and related puzzles  has given rise to an industry  of 
"solutions."  One  class of "solutions"  preserves  the frictionless-markets 
framework,  but modifies  preferences  or technology  to produce  the ap- 
propriate mean  and standard  deviation  of discount  factors.  Space does 
not  allow  us  a complete  review  of  all the  preferences  that  have  been 
proposed,  but these  may  give  some  of the flavor. 
3.1 HABIT  PERSISTENCE 
Constantinides  (1990),  Heaton  (1991),  and  Ferson  and  Constantinides 
(1991) have looked  at implications  of models  in which  consumers'  pref- 
erences  display  habit persistence.  In these  preference  orderings,  a high 
value  of consumption  yesterday  raises the marginal utility of consump- 
tion today.  For instance,  the time t period utility function  now  depends 
on  ct -  Oct_1 instead  of just  ct where  0 is  positive.  As  a result  of the 
positive  value  of 0, a given  series  on  consumption  is transformed  into 
a more  volatile  marginal  rate of  substitution  series.  The marginal  rate 
of substitution  for this utility function  can be expressed  as 
m  /t  (Act)- (ACt+l  -  0)  7 -  _O(Act+l)-?  Et+l (ACt+2 --  0)-Y  ?,. = PtAc,)- 
- 
(3.1) 
(Act -  O)-'  -  p0(ACt)-Y Et(ACt+1  -  0)-  ( 
where  Act =  ct/lct_  and  Et is the  expectation  operator  conditioned  on 
time t information. 
Notice  that formula  (3.1) requires the evaluation  of some  conditional 
expectations.  To get  a rough  idea  of how  the  resulting  stochastic  dis- 
count  factor behaves,  we  made  the  simplifying  assumption  that  con- 
sumption  growth  rates are independent  and identically  distributed over 
time.  This  allowed  to  us  to  approximate  conditional  expectations  by 
their unconditional  counterparts.  For a more serious investigation  of the 
properties  of  the  implied  stochastic  discount  factors,  a reader  should 
consult  Gallant,  Hansen,  and  Tauchen  (1990)  and  Heaton  (1991). 
Among  other  things,  Heaton's  analysis  includes  an  explicit  model  of 
consumption  growth  at finer than quarterly frequencies  and  addresses 
the issue  of time-aggregation  biases. 
Figure 6 includes  calculations  of the mean  and  standard deviation  of 
this candidate  discount  factor, using  habit parameters  0 =  0.5 and 0 = 
0.6.  Figure 6 contains  two  curves  indexed  by the choice  of 0. As Figure 
6 shows,  the effect of habit persistence  is to raise both the mean and the 
standard deviation  of the discount  factor for a given power  coefficient  y. 
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els,  notice  that  the  two  habit  persistence  curves  in Figure  6 enter  the 
feasible region Y at considerably  lower power  parameters,  y =  12.5 and 
y  =  7.5  respectively.  Hence,  Figure  6  demonstrates  how  habit- 
persistence  can  be  used  as  a  substitute  for  extremely  large  curvature 
parameters as a device  for increasing  the volatility of candidate  discount 
factors.  Ferson  and  Constantinides  (1991)  entertained  considerably 
larger values  of the  habit  persistence  parameter  0. While  these  values 
Figure  6 NON-TIME-SEPARABLE  UTILITY 
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of 0 further increase  the volatility  of the candidate  m, values  of 0 close 
to  one  can  lead  to  the  consumers  being  "satiated"  in  numeraire  con- 
sumption  good,  i.e.,  the numerator  and denominator  terms of (3.1) can 
be negative  (see Heaton,  1991, for some  examples). 
Abel  (1990) argued  for a form of habit persistence  he  calls "catch up 
with  the Joneses"  utility,  in which  the time t utility function  of an indi- 
vidual  consumer  depends  on the ratio ct/c_l  and ct_  is aggregate  con- 
sumption  in  the  previous  time  period.  Individual  consumers  treat the 
aggregate  parametrically,  so they  presume  that their own  consumption 
behavior  cannot  influence  the aggregate.  The idea is that you  only  care 
how  well  you  do  relative  to everyone  else.  In the  equilibrium  c'  =  ct, 
this specification  of preferences  leads  to a stochastic  discount  factor: 
Ct+1  t1 
mt+  ( 
/t  (+  )  (3.2) 
ct  /  C\t-i/ 
Note  that the conditional  expectations  that enter equation  (3.1) are ab- 
sent  from  equation  (3.2).  The  marginal  rate of  substitution  enters  the 
feasible  region  at a value  of y around  40.  Because  Em now  always  in- 
creases  with  y,  the  difference  between  the  equity-premium  region  3 
and the  original return region  y  is less  critical in assessing  the  model. 
In other words,  while  there  still seems  to be an Equity-Premium  Puzzle, 
the Riskfree-Rate  Puzzle is much  less  evident  with  this preference  speci- 
fication. 
3.2 NONEXPECTED  UTILITY 
Epstein and Zin (1991) used  a recursive  utility formulation  that relaxes 
the usual  assumption  of separability  across states  (see also Weil,  1989). 
An  interesting  feature  of  their  specification  is  that  the  intertemporal 
marginal rates of substitution  depend  on powers  of consumption  ratios 
in  adjacent  time  periods  and  the  return  on  the  wealth  portfolio.  The 
formula for the resulting  discount  factor is 
+  =(  -  w,t+  (3.3) 
where  rw,+1 is the gross  return on the wealth  portfolio,  P is positive,  p 
is  unrestricted,  y  has  the  same  sign  as  p  +  1 and  p <  y.  When  p is 
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Zin so that distinct parameters are used  to capture the separate contribu- 
tions  of  the  consumption  growth  and  the  return  on  the  wealth  port- 
folio.)  The reason  that market-wealth  return enters  in equation  (3.3) is 
that Epstein  and Zin wanted  an "observable"  proxy for the innovation 
in  the  equilibrium  utility  index.  They  derived  such  a  proxy  by  "in- 
verting"  the  pricing formula  for market-wealth  return. 
Figure 7 presents  the means  and standard  deviations  of the Epstein- 
Zin (1991) marginal rates of substitution  for several different parameter 
configurations.  Following  Epstein  and Zin, we  measured  the return on 
the wealth  portfolio by the value-weighted  NYSE return. In all cases we 
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set  3 =  1 as a benchmark.  As before,  it is easy  to see  how  changes  in 
3 alter the  mean-standard  deviation  pair.  Figure  8  gives  four  curves 
depicted  by  solid  lines  and  indexed  by four different  values  of p: p  = 
-  3,  -1,  0, and 3. Movements  along each curve corresponds  to changes 
in  y.  When  p  =  -1,  the  curve  is  reduced  to  a single  point,  and  the 
resulting  m is just  the  reciprocal of the  return on  the wealth  portfolio. 
When  p  =  0,  the  curve  becomes  the  power  utility  curve  depicted  in 
previous  figures. 
As  is evident  from this  picture,  variability in the  candidate  m is en- 
hanced  by increasing  p1, that is,  having  the  market enter with  higher 
(absolute)  powers.  Changing  y has  a relatively  greater impact  on  the 
mean  discount  factor  than  its  standard  deviation.  Thus,  most  of  the 
ability of  this  model  to  generate  volatile  discount  factors  comes  from 
the  contribution  of  the  proxy  for the  wealth  return,  rather than  from 
the contribution  of consumption. 
3.3 PRODUCTION-BASED  MODELS 
One  can also  build  models  of stochastic  discount  factors by exploiting 
intertemporal production  functions.  To this end,  Cochrane (1991, 1992a) 
and  Braun (1991) showed  how  to  construct  a time  series  of the  (mar- 
ginal) physical returns to investment  from production  data given a spec- 
ification of an intertemporal  production  function  and its parameters.  In 
a frictionless-markets  setting,  these  investment  returns should  obey the 
same pricing relations as returns constructed  from security market data. 
One  could  therefore  check  whether  physical  returns  to investment  are 
priced  compatibly  with  security  market returns.  However,  our earlier 
comments  about the flexibility of the frictionless-markets  paradigm also 
apply  to this  question  of pricing  compatibility.  Thus,  it does  not  seem 
to  us  to  be  fruitful  to  devise  a  formal  "test"  of  pricing  compatibility 
without  narrowing  the class of valuation  models. 
Investment  returns  can  be  used  more  judiciously  in  the  context  of 
particular valuation  models  that express  a stochastic  discount  factor as 
a function  of  investment  returns.  For instance,  Cochrane  (1991) con- 
structed  and  studied  a broadly  based  measure  of the  aggregate  return 
to investment  derived  from an adjustment  cost model  of the aggregate 
intertemporal  production  technology.  Such  a  return  might  provide  a 
more comprehensive  measure  of the return to the wealth  portfolio than 
the value-weighted  return on the NYSE. It could be used  to replace the 
market return in a test  of the  Epstein  and  Zin  (1991) model  or in tests 
of the traditional linear capital asset  pricing model. 
Alternatively,  Cochrane  (1992a) constructed  an  exact  factor  pricing 
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as factors. By design  factor models  provide  additional flexibility for satis- 
fying pricing relations  because  of the freedom  to select  factor loadings. 
For instance,  the  factor loadings  and  technology  parameters  in  Coch- 
rane's model  can be chosen  to exactly satisfy the sample moment  condi- 
tions for the value-weighted  NYSE and T-bill returns used in this section 
and,  hence,  to  satisfy  the  volatility  bounds.  However,  because  of the 
selection  of factor loadings,  diagnostics  focusing  on  only  the  first two 
moments  of stochastic discount  factors that we study in this section may 
not be particularly illuminating  for assessing  the performance  of factor 
models. 
3.4 CORRELATION  OF DISCOUNT  FACTORS  WITH  ASSET  RETURNS 
As  we  saw  in  Section  2,  stochastic  discount  factors  on  the  mean- 
standard  deviation  frontier  (on  the  frontier of the  region  U) are linear 
combinations  of the  payoff  vector  x and  a unit  payoff.  In terms  of the 
least squares regression  (2.8), they are given  by a +  b'x.  Thus,  the least 
volatile  stochastic  discount  factors are perfectly  correlated with  a payoff 
of  a portfolio  of  the  assets  used  in  an  econometric  analysis.  In other 
words,  the R2 obtained by regressing  a frontier y onto x and a constant is 
one.  Candidate  discount  factors implied by alternative economic  models 
often  produce  regression  R2 that are substantially  less  than one. 
Rearranging the definition  of R2, we  obtain 
var(y)  =  [var(x'b)]/R2.  (3.4) 
This formula can be used  to construct  iso-R2 contours  that lie above  the 
boundary  of  S. These  contours  are obtained  by magnifying  the original 
standard  deviation  bounds  by  the  square  root  of  the  reciprocal of the 
R2. If a candidate  discount  factor is  not  perfectly  correlated  with  the 
asset  payoff  vector x, it must  be more volatile  than the bounds  derived 
in Section 2. 
Rather than report regression  R2's for alternative  candidate  discount 
factors and trace out the corresponding  iso-R2 contours,  it is more conve- 
nient  to study  the  volatility  of the  least  squares  projection  of m onto  x 
and a constant.  It follows  from the analysis  in Section  2 that if a candi- 
date m is a valid  discount  factor, then  so is its least-squares  projection 
onto x and a constant.  Hence,  the mean  and standard  deviation  of this 
projection  should  satisfy  the  original  bounds  derived  in  Section  2. 
Clearly the  standard  deviation  of  this  projection  can be  low,  even  for 
highly  volatile  candidate  discount  factors,  if the  candidates  are poorly 
correlated with  asset  returns. 
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Figure 8. VOLATILITY BOUNDS,  WITH STANDARD  DEVIATION OF 
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reports p =  -3.  Symbols  are plotted  at y increments  of 10 for "Power" and  "Abel,"  at y increments 
of 5 for "Habit," and at y increments  of 1 for "Epstein  and Zin." 
candidate  discount  factors  onto  a  constant  and  the  excess  return  of 
stocks  over  bonds.  Hence,  the  feasible  region  of interest  is  the  excess 
return region  2.  The figure reports the means  and standard  deviations 
of the fitted projections.10 
As is evident  from the figure,  the power  utility and habit persistence 
candidate  discount  factors are poorly  correlated  with  the excess  return 
10. We could have regressed  the candidates  onto a constant  and both returns. This would 
increase variability of the projection but shrink the feasible region.  A version  of Figure 
8 constructed  with  two  returns  looks  somewhat  different  than Figure 8. We present 
the excess  return version  because  it was  more  "puzzling." 
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and, hence,  their volatility  is substantially  reduced  by the initial regres- 
sion.  In contrast,  versions  of  the  Epstein-Zin  discount  factor retain  a 
high degree of variability once correlation with the excess return is taken 
into  account.  This is not  surprising  because  these  discount  factors are 
constructed  using  (a nonlinear  function  of)  the  value-weighted  NYSE 
return  to  proxy  for the  return  on  the  wealth  portfolio.  (We have  not 
attempted  to account  for sampling  error. As before,  we  are not propos- 
ing these  calculations  as substitutes  for formal statistical testing.) 
The Epstein-Zin  calculations  are likely  to be misleading  because  the 
value-weighted  return on the  NYSE may behave  quite  differently  than 
true  wealth  portfolio  returns.  For instance,  the  aggregate  investment 
return constructed  in Cochrane  (1991) is less  correlated with  the excess 
return of stocks over bonds.  Furthermore,  recall that the market return 
enters  the  Epstein-Zin  candidate  discount  factors  as  a proxy  for  the 
innovation  in the recursive utility index valuated  at the equilibrium con- 
sumption  process.  Hence,  an  alternative  strategy  to construct  the  im- 
plied stochastic  discount  factor is to use  an estimated  law of motion  for 
consumption  to  infer  the  innovation.  This  approach  would  avoid  the 
implicit assumption  that consumption  coincides  with  dividends,  and it 
is also likely to result in lower  correlation with  the excess  return."1 
The  inclusion  of  the  R2 dimension  to  the  stochastic  discount  factor 
characterization adds an extra challenge  to proponents  of market incom- 
pleteness  as  a source  of  discount  rate variability.  Incomplete  markets 
may  still be  frictionless.  In this  case,  each consumer's  marginal rate of 
substitution  mi should  still satisfy the asset pricing equation  q  =  E(mix), 
so each consumer's  marginal rate of substitution  should  satisfy the vola- 
tility bounds.  Thus,  incomplete  market models  must  generate  individ- 
ual consumption  growth  series that are not only highly volatile,  but that 
are also better correlated with  asset  payoffs  than is aggregate  consump- 
tion  growth.  But a model  whose  main  assumption  is  that  individual 
incomes  cannot be  insured  in  formal  security  markets  seems  designed 
to generate  individual  consumption  variability that is uncorrelated  with 
payoffs  on traded assets.12 
4. Implications  for Models  with Borrowing  Constraints 
In  this  section  we  consider  the  implications  of  asset  market  data  for 
models  in which  some  consumers  face borrowing  constraints.  Our dis- 
11. This second approach  could also be used to provide an information-based  decomposi- 
tion of the unconditional  volatility  described  in Section  2.7 applied to the Epstein-Zin 
(1991)  model. 
12. It is possible  to create such models. For example, Constantinides  and Duffie (1992) 
showed how to construct  examples of incomplete  market  economies in which individ- 
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cussion  illustrates how  market  frictions can loosen  the link between  asset 
markets  and  measured  intertemporal  marginal  rates  of  substitution 
based on aggregate  data. Of course,  borrowing  constraints  are only one 
form of market  friction  that  might  be  quantitatively  important.  Other 
frictions  include  incomplete  markets,  proportional  transactions  costs 
such  as bid-ask  spreads,  and  budget  constraint  kinks  due  to taxation. 
We have  already commented  on models  with  incomplete  markets,  and 
we will comment  briefly on transactions  costs in our concluding  subsec- 
tion. One reason we focus on models  with borrowing constraints is that, 
in contrast to some  other forms  of transactions  costs,  their quantitative 
impact is not likely to be confined  to high-frequency  movements  in the 
time  series  data.  Quite  the  contrary,  borrowing  constraints,  if impor- 
tant,  should  distort the pricing links  to intertemporal  marginal rates of 
substitution  at low  frequencies  as well. 
4.1 ISSUES  IN MODEL  FORMULATION 
It is straightforward to see how  an individual's  Euler equation is modified 
by a borrowing  constraint:  The  Euler equality  is replaced  by  an  Euler 
inequality,  reflecting  the  presence  of nonnegative  Kuhn-Tucker  multi- 
pliers on the constraints.  More thought  is required to relate asset prices 
to economic  aggregates, because  aggregate  consumption  sums  over indi- 
viduals  who  are constrained  and others  who  are not. 
For this reason,  we sketch a simple model with borrowing constraints. 
The setup is taken from Townsend  (1980) and is a simple version  of one 
used  by Bewley  (1980). There are two  consumer  types,  A and  B. Their 
endowments  of a nonstorable  good  oscillate between  chigh  and clow.  Con- 
sumers  of  type  A  begin  with  Chigh  and  B consumers  begin  with  clow. 
There is no uncertainty  and no variation in the aggregate  endowment. 
Consumers  have  the same  time-separable  power  utility function. 
In the absence  of impediments  to communication,  agents  would  bor- 
row and lend to achieve  constant  (Pareto optimal) consumption  profiles. 
We suppose  instead  that consumers  are not allowed  to borrow.  Town- 
send  (1980) gave  a "turnpike  version"  of this model  to justify  formally 
the imposition  of borrowing  constraints  through  a physical impediment 
to communication. 
In the  presence  of borrowing  constraints,  there is no  trade,  and  the 
equilibrium interest rates are set so that the unconstrained  consumers  are 
content  to consume  their endowments.  In other  words,  the  price q of 
the riskless  bond  is given  by 
q  =  mu  = 
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where mu  is the intertemporal  marginal rate of substitution  of the uncon- 
strained  consumer.  Clearly,  mu is  greater  than  the  intertemporal  mar- 
ginal rate of substitution  of the constrained  consumer,  that is, is greater 
than  P(Chigh/Clow)-' 
We want  to know  what  happens  when  an econometrician  uses  aggre- 
gate data to measure  the intertemporal  marginal rate of substitution.  In 
this simple  illustration,  there is no aggregate  variation  so that the mea- 
sured  aggregate  intertemporal  marginal  rate  of  substitution,  denoted 
ma, is just p.  Consequently,  the  econometrician  constructs  a candidate 
that is less than the  discount  factor: 
mu >  ma =  p.  (4.2) 
This downward  bias in ma is inherited  from the  distortion  in the inter- 
temporal  marginal  rate  of  substitution  of  the  constrained  consumers. 
The candidate stochastic discount  factor based on aggregate data implies 
a lower  price for a one-period  bond  and,  hence,  a higher  interest  rate. 
While this  "incorrect" use  of aggregate  data leads  to a "pricing error," 
the price is biased  in a predictable  direction. 
Next  we  modify  this  setup  by  introducing  in  turn  two  alternative 
means  for consumers  to substitute  consumption  over  time: valued-fiat 
money  and  a storage  technology.  Consider  first a version  of this econ- 
omy  with  valued-fiat  money.  If the  consumers  with  low  endowments 
have  money,  they  will exchange  this money  for goods  as long  as mu in 
(4.1) measured  at the pretrade endowment  position  is greater than one. 
Townsend  (1980) showed  that in a setup  with  a constant  (noninterven- 
tionist) money  supply,  the equilibrium  consumption  sequences  of each 
agent  still oscillate  and  that  nonnegativity  constraints  on  money  bind 
in alternating  periods.  A version  of equations  (4.1) and  (4.2) still hold 
for  this  economy  with  the  appropriate  alterations.  In  particular,  the 
equilibrium q is one in Townsend's  monetary  economy  because  the real 
rate of return to holding  money  is zero,  and  clow  and  chigh  now  denote 
equilibrium rather than endowment  consumption  levels.  The allocation 
associated  with  the monetary  equilibrium  Pareto dominates  that of au- 
tarky; however,  because  the  real return to holding  money  is less  than 
P-~,  it is still not Pareto optimal. 
A  storage  technology  with  zero  depreciation  leads  to  very  similar 
implications.  In such  an  economy,  the  intertemporal  marginal  rate of 
transformation  pins  down  the  single-period  asset  return,  so  the  real 
interest  rate  is  zero.  One  can  thus  reinterpret  Townsend's  monetary 
economy  as  one  in  which  the  equilibrium  consumption  oscillates  be- 
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time period. Relations (4.1) and (4.2) continue to apply for q equal to 
the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation  determined by the 
storage technology. 
For reasons of empirical plausibility, we are interested in observable 
implications  that can accommodate  much more general endowment pat- 
terns than the ones specified by the previous illustrations.  For instance, 
it is potentially important to accommodate stochastic endowments that 
grow over time and stochastic technologies for transferring  consump- 
tion from one period to the next. (Bewley, 1980, allowed for stochastic 
endowments in his general setup and Deaton, 1991, incorporated  en- 
dowment growth into a stochastic environment.) Nevertheless, the ex- 
ample economies we discussed illustrate the following related features 
that occur  more generally:  (1) some consumers are up against borrowing 
constraints in equilibrium, (2) the market discount factor for pricing 
assets equals the intertemporal  marginal  rate of substitution of uncon- 
strained consumers, and (3) an intertemporal  marginal  rate of substitu- 
tion measured using aggregate data is less than or equal to the market 
discount factor and the marginal rate of substitution of unconstrained 
consumers. 
Feature (1) does not always emerge because consumers may save to 
avoid the borrowing  constraint  in some models. For  instance, by making 
the storage technology in the previous example productive so that the 
stored good is interpreted  as a capital  stock, the zero interest rate impli- 
cation is avoided. If this technology is too productive (relative  to  - 1)  or 
if the utility cost to being constrained is too severe, then the borrowing 
constraints  may not bind in equilibrium  (e.g., see Bewley, 1977;  Deaton, 
1991;  Scheinkman  and Weiss, 1986). On the other hand, Deaton (1991) 
emphasized that endowment growth may make borrowing constraints 
more likely to bind in equilibrium. 
Feature (2) has led some empirical  researchers  to attempt to identify 
a sample of "unconstrained"  consumers (e.g., see Hayashi, 1987;  Man- 
kiw and Zeldes, 1991; Runkle, 1991; Zeldes, 1989) and examine asset 
pricing implications for these individuals. In line with the calculations 
reported in the previous sections, we are primarily  interested in asset 
pricing  implications  for aggregate time series data on consumption. Fur- 
thermore, as is manifested in implication (3), the measured marginal 
rates of substitution using aggregate data should still be informative 
even though they are "contaminated"  by the consumption of the con- 
strained consumers. Recall that this inequality implication results be- 
cause aggregate data combines the consumption of the constrained  and 
unconstrained  individuals. 
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downward distortion of the measured intertemporal  marginal rate of 
substitution obtained using aggregate consumption data. Not surpris- 
ingly, this implication  can be obtained for much more general specifica- 
tions  of  economies  with  borrowing  constraints.  However,  once 
uncertainty is incorporated, there are alternative ways of formalizing 
the notion of a borrowing constraint (e.g.,  see Hindy, 1992; Zeldes, 
1989), and we will investigate two such alternatives. 
Suppose that an individual i faces a sequence of one-period budget 
constraints  of the form: 
ci +  E(ypilj)  =  e1  (4.3) 
where ci is consumption of person i in the current time period, y is 
the market-determined  stochastic discount factor  for pricing one-period 
securities, pi is the payoff in the subsequent time period of securities 
purchased in the current time period, and e1  is income including an 
exogenous endowment and the security market payoff in the current 
time period. Hence, E(ypil'S)  is the market value of payoff p', and the 
budget constraint says that consumption plus the value of securities 
purchased  must equal an endowment plus the payoffs of securities  pre- 
viously purchased. In addition, we  restrict the payoff p1  to be in an 
information  set ~' available  in the subsequent time period. 
Following Luttmer  (1991), one of the forms of a borrowing constraint 
we consider is referred  to as a solvency  constraint:13 
pi1  0.  (4.4) 
That is,  any contingent contract that includes debt in some states is 
prohibited. A solvency constraint  can be motivated by the severe limits 
on communication in Townsend's (1980) turnpike setup when uncer- 
tainty is explicitly introduced.14 
A second weaker notion of a borrowing  constraint  is a restriction  that 
the current-period  value of the portfolio payoff be nonnegative: 
E(yp lC)  -  0.  (4.5) 
13. Our use of the term solvency  constraint is different from that of Hindy (1992). For 
Hindy (1992), a solvency constraint encompasses a broad class of borrowing con- 
straints including short-sale constraints and a market-wealth  constraint as special 
cases. 
14. Less severe impediments to communication  have been explored by Townsend and 
Wallace  (1987)  and Manuelli and Sargent (1992).  In their environments, private  debt 
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It states that the value of the consumer's  portfolio today  must be nonneg- 
ative,  and  we  will  refer to  it  as  a market-wealth  constraint. It does  not 
preclude p' from being  negative  in some  states of the world.  This restric- 
tion  has  been  used  by  Zeldes  (1989),  He  and  Modest  (1991),  Hindy 
(1992),  and  Santos  and  Woodford  (1992),  among  others,  and  is  moti- 
vated  by  a  restriction  that  a  consumer  is  prohibited  from  borrowing 
against future endowments  (or sometimes  labor income)  to support con- 
sumption  today.15 
Because  we  are interested  in arbitrage-free  models,  or equivalently, 
models  in which  all nontrivial event  contingent  claims have strictly posi- 
tive  prices  (92Pry >  0}  =  1),  both  versions  of  borrowing  constraints 
eliminate  pure  debt-contingent  contracts  (nontrivial  choices  of  pi that 
are less  than  or equal  to  zero).  This  is  the  sense  in  which  both  con- 
straints  eliminate  pure  borrowing.  The  market-wealth  constraint  is  less 
restrictive because  it permits  pt  to be negative  on some  nontrivial event 
as  long  as  pi is  positive  on  other  events  so  that  its  market  value  is 
nonnegative.  As we  will  see,  because  the solvency constraint represents 
a more severe  limitation  on portfolio  choices,  it leads  to weaker  empirical 
implications  for  marginal  rates  of  substitution  than  the  market-wealth 
constraint. 
To ascertain which  constraint  is better justified  would  require a more 
serious modeling  endeavor  that examines  what impediments  to commu- 
nication underlie  the constraints.  The solvency  constraint may be prob- 
lematic  because  of  the  potential  difficulty  in  practice  of  establishing 
whether  a complicated  security  market  transaction  does  indeed  result 
in a limited  liability  payoff.  On  the  other  hand,  the  market-wealth  con- 
straint may be hard to justify because  it does  not eliminate  consumers' 
ability  to  engage  in  extreme  short-selling  strategies  as  a  device  for 
smoothing  consumption  across  states  in subsequent  time periods. 
In many  setups,  borrowing  constraints  are imposed  simultaneously 
with  other  forms  of market incompleteness.  For instance,  if there  is a 
small collection  of underlying  limited  liability securities,  an alternative 
more  severe  notion  of  a solvency constraint  is  a set  of  short  sale  con- 
straints on  the  individual  securities.  Similarly,  the  market wealth  con- 
straint is often coupled  with other forms of market incompleteness  (e.g., 
see  Bewley,  1977; Santos  and Woodford,  1992; Scheinkman  and Weiss, 
1986). 
15. Because  constraint  (4.5) is stated in terms of market  wealth and, hence, permits  pi to 
be negative with positive probability,  we have implicitly ruled out security payoffs 
whose market  value is ambiguous.  That  is, we have eliminated  payoffs  whose negative 
part  has a market  value - oc, even though it is offset by a positive part  with a market 
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In our analysis,  we  will  follow  Luttmer (1991) and  consider  the case 
in which  security  markets  are complete  except  for the borrowing  con- 
straint.  That is,  consumers  are permitted  to  write  general  contingent 
contracts that respect  the borrowing  constraint  and are verifiable in the 
subsequent  time period  (have  payoffs  in  s').  Consequently,  we  do not 
consider  the potentially  interesting  interaction between  borrowing  con- 
straints  and  market  incompleteness.16  A  benefit  to  permitting  a  rich 
array of security market transactions  is that we can apply an aggregation 
result of Luttmer (1991) to characterize the behavior of the intertemporal 
marginal  rate  of  substitution  constructed  from  aggregate  time  series 
data. 
4.2 OBSERVABLE  IMPLICATIONS 
In the periodic endowment  model  discussed  previously,  we  saw how  a 
simple model  with  a borrowing  constraint led to the implication  (3) that 
the  measured  intertemporal  marginal  rate of  substitution  using  aggre- 
gate  data is less  than  or equal  to  the  market  discount  factor.  Luttmer 
(1991) showed  that the same relation applies  in stochastic environments 
and with  a solvency  constraint. 
To understand  this restriction better,  we  briefly sketch  the argument 
used  by  Luttmer (1991). Let C+  denote  the  cone of payoffs  that can be 
obtained  from one-period  security  market transactions  consistent  with 
the solvency  constraint.  The payoffs  in C+ include  all random variables 
that are nonnegative  and  in  the  set  1g' of information  available  in the 
subsequent  then time  period.  The first-order conditions  for consumer  i 
facing a solvency  constraint  can be characterized  conveniently  as 
E(miplI)  c  E(yplI6)  for all p in C+.  (4.6) 
In effect, the usual Euler equality is replaced by an inequality because  of 
the presence  of a Kuhn-Tucker  multiplier from the solvency  constraint. 
Given  the  complete  markets  construction  of  the  cone  C+ and  the  fact 
that mi and y are in the cone,  it follows  that 
mi  y.  (4.7) 
Furthermore, Luttmer (1991) showed  that, if all consumers  have iden- 
tical power  utility  functions  with  a common  subjective  discount  factor, 
16. For  instance, in the incomplete markets  equilibrium  of Scheinkman  and Weiss' (1986) 
model, even though the borrowing  constraints  are slack, their presence has a nontriv- 
ial impact  on the competitive  equilibrium  consumption  allocation  over time and across 
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the intertemporal  marginal rate of substitution ma  inherits the down- 
ward bias of the individual intertemporal  marginal  rate of substitution: 
ma <  y.  (4.8) 
Thus, implication (3) continues to hold in this more general stochastic 
setting. 
Next we  follow He and Modest (1991) in our consideration of the 
less restrictive  market  wealth constraint  (4.5). Consumers can now form 
portfolio payoffs in addition to those in the cone C+. For instance, let 
Z denote the set of one-period security  market  payoffs with zero market 
prices, i.e., excess returns. Any payoff in Z clearly satisfies the market- 
wealth constraint. As emphasized by He and Modest (1991), for these 
portfolio payoffs we still obtain the usual Euler equality: 
E(m'zlj) =  E(yzlj')  =  0  for all z in Z.  (4.9) 
Note that the payoff mi -  yE(ymij')/E(y2Cfi)  has a zero market price 
and, hence, is in Z. Using this payoff as z in equation (4.9), it follows 
that 
m' =  iy for ti _  E(ym'i  l)/E(y21C  ).  (4.10) 
Furthermore,  equation (4.8) implies that 0 <  i  c  1. The random  variable 
J/'  captures the distortion in the marginal  rate of substitution caused by 
the presence of the market-wealth  constraint, and 1 -  'i can be viewed 
as the "shadow value" of the borrowing  constraint  in terms of consump- 
tion in the now time period. In summary, the less restrictive market- 
wealth  constraint  implies  a  more  stringent  implication  that  the 
intertemporal  marginal rate of substitution is proportional  to y (condi- 
tioned on '6). 
Again, a version of Luttmer's aggregation result for power utility 
functions applies. The market-wealth constraint is related to an eco- 
nomic aggregate  measure of the intertemporal  marginal  rate of substitu- 
tion via: 
ma =  iay.  (4.11) 
Mimicking  the usual aggregation  arguments for power utility functions, 
it is straightforward  to show that 
-  -1/a 
:a  =  ^  (T)a(cc)  , Ca  =  >  c', a =  -1/I,  (4.12) 
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and  ci is consumption  of person  i in  the  now time  period.  Hence,  the 
distortion factor  Ja that emerges  in the aggregate  relation is a geometric 
weighted  average  of  the  individual  4i's  with  consumption  weights  in 
the conditioning  information  set  3. Therefore,  like 4i,  qa  is in the condi- 
tioning  information  set  J and is between  zero and  one. 
4.3 RESULTS 
In Figure  9 we  report  the  boundaries  of  three  feasible  sets  of  mean- 
standard  deviation  pairs.  First we  reproduce  the region  S+,  described 
in Section  2,  of mean-standard  deviation  pairs for nonnegative  market 
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discount factors y. The second region, denoted 2  +,  is the feasible set 
for the aggregate measures ma  of intertemporal  marginal  rates of substi- 
tution that satisfy restriction (4.8) implied by the solvency constraint. 
The third region, denoted  W  +,  is the feasible set for random variables 
ma  that also satisfy the proportionality  restriction  (4.11). The regions are 
constructed using  results from Luttmer (1991) and He  and Modest 
(1991),  and the mechanics underlying these constructions  are provided 
in the next subsection. All three regions were constructed using the 
same quarterly  value-weighted and T-bill  return series used in many of 
our previous figures. Of course, both  3 + and  M  +  are expanded ver- 
sions of the set Y +, and the feasible set W + is smaller than 3 + because 
it incorporates  the additional proportionality  restriction. 
As before, we use triangles to record the mean-standard deviation 
pairs of aggregate measures of intertemporal  marginal  rates of substitu- 
tion for several choices of the power  - y. Abstracting  from sampling 
error,  values of y in the vicinity of 40 are necessary to get into the more 
restrictive  market-wealth  region OW+,  whereas values as low as 15 en- 
ter the solvency region 2.  Reducing the subjective discount factor P 
to values less than one increases the range of y's that are inside the 
respective regions. Fairly sizable curvature values are still required to 
"resolve" the Equity-Premium  Puzzle for either version of a borrowing 
constraint, especially for the market-wealth constraint. However, the 
Riskfree-Rate  Puzzle  now disappears. 
In the case of the market-wealth constraint and say,  y  =  40, the 
distortion factor ECf required for (4.10) to be satisfied is on average 
about  .87,  which  may  seem  implausibly  large.  Recall  that  1  -  4i  is 
shadow value of the market-wealth constraint for person i. Hence, 1 
-  Eqf is a (somewhat complicated) "average" shadow value where 
averaging takes place across consumers and over states of the world. 
When y  =  40, this "average"  shadow value is about 0.13 for quarterly 
data. Consequently, the presence of a market-wealth  constraint elimi- 
nates the Riskfree-Rate  Puzzle by  presuming there is  a high  average 
shadow value for the constraint. Subsection  4.5 below includes a related 
reservation  about the solvency constraint. 
4.4 COMPUTATION 
We now describe  how to compute the boundaries of the solvency region  + and market-wealth region W  +  reported in Figure 9. As indicated 
previously, Luttmer  (1991)  provided a general algorithm  for calculating 
the lower envelope of 2 +. The algorithm  is fairly  easy to describe  when 
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in our application,  we  used  the value-weighted  and T-bill returns as our 
payoffs,  both  of which  we  interpret  as having  limited  liability. 
Let x denote  a random  vector  formed  by stacking  these  two  returns, 
and let P+  denote  the cone  of limited-liability  payoffs  that can be con- 
structed from constant-weighted  portfolios: 
P+  {p:  p  =  c *  x for c E  R2, p 2  0}.  (4.13) 
Any  ma that is less  than  or equal  to y will  assign  a price to a payoff  in 
P+ that is less  than or equal to its market price: 
E(map)  '  E(yp)  for all p in P+.  (4.14) 
Because  portfolio  payoffs  outside  of  P+  are  sometimes  negative,  the 
price distortion  for these  payoffs  is ambiguous  in sign. 
Next,  note  that  in  exploring  the  ramifications  of  equation  (4.14),  it 
suffices  to  look  at  the  two  edge portfolios,  say,  p,  and  P2. Any  other 
payoff  in P+  is a convex  combination  of these  edges  with  nonnegative 
portfolio weights.  Because  the original two  securities  have nonnegative 
payoffs,  each edge  has a positive  portfolio weight  on one of these  securi- 
ties and a nonpositive  weight  on  the other.17 We normalize  these  edge 
payoffs  so  that  their  price  is  one,  that  is,  they  are  returns,  and  we 
number them  so that 
Ep1  >  Ep2.  (4.15) 
It turns  out  the  boundary  of  ~  + has  three  segments.  First, there  is 
a horizontal  segment  at  r(ma) =  0 from  E(ma) =  0 to  E(ma) =  1/Epl. 
This segment  is present  because  for any constant  ma  between  zero and 
1/Epl,  inequality  (4.14)  is satisfied  for both  p, and  P2. Furthermore,  as 
long  as the  constant  is strictly less  than  1/Ep1, the  inequalities  will  be 
strict. When the constant  is equal to 1/Ep1,  (4.14) will hold with equality 
by construction  for edge  payoff pi. This is the point at which  the second 
segment  begins. 
The second  segment  of the boundary  of  3 + coincides  with a segment 
17. The payoffs we used are strictly  positive for all dates in the sample. We approximated 
the edges by initially holding fixed the positive weight and adjusting the negative 
weight until the resulting portfolio  payoff is zero at one sample point and positive at 
all other points. In practice, approximation  of edges using the empirical  distribution 
may be poor because upper and lower endpoints of these distributions  may be hard 
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of the boundary  of feasible  mean-standard  deviation  region  YS for sto- 
chastic  discount  factors  that  correctly  price p,  (but not  necessarily  P2). 
The boundary  of Yf  touches  the  horizontal  axis at the  point  (1/Ep1,O) 
because  as was  just mentioned,  a constant  discount  factor 1/Ep1 prices 
p, correctly. Furthermore,  any other frontier discount  factor for YS will 
also  be a frontier random  variable for 2  + as long  as  (4.14) is satisfied 
for P2. Hence,  to construct  the second  segment  of the boundary  of 2  +, 
we  follow  the right boundary  of  fi  until we  obtain a frontier discount 
factor that also just prices P2 correctly. 
The third segment  of the boundary  of  3 + coincides  with  a segment 
of  the  boundary  of  the  region  S+,  of  stochastic  discount  factors  that 
price correctly  all constant-weighted  portfolios  of value-weighted  and 
T-bill returns.  Such  discount  factors  satisfy  (4.14) with  equality  for all 
admissible  payoffs.18 
Consider next the boundary  of  W  +  . This construction  follows  He and 
Modest  (1991) and is included  here for completeness.  Multiplying  both 
sides of (4.11) by x, taking expectations  (first conditioned  on '  and then 
unconditionally),  we  have 
E(max) =  (Eqf)q  , where  0 <  Efa  ?  1.  (4.16) 
Consequently,  for any  ma satisfying  equation  (4.11),  we  can find a sto- 
chastic discount  factor ma/Era that prices the payoffs  in x correctly. 
Because  the means  and standard  deviations  of scale multiples  of ran- 
dom variables simply  inherit the same scaling,  the link between  S + and 
W  +  is  particularly  simple.  Scale  all  of  the  points  in  SD+  by  arbitrary 
numbers  between  zero  and  one,  that is,  for any  point  in S+,  the  ray 
from the  origin  to  this  point  is  in W  +.  Notice  from  Figure  9 that  the 
boundary  of W + has two segments.  One coincides  with a portion of the 
boundary  of S +, and the other coincides  with a portion of the boundary 
of the  analogous  region  constructed  using  the  excess  return  of  stocks 
over bonds. 
4.5 USING  AGGREGATES  TO SHARPEN  BOUNDS 
ON MARKET  DISCOUNT  FACTORS 
There is a different way to use the information  contained  in the marginal 
rates  of  substitution  based  on  aggregate  data  in  the  presence  of  bor- 
rowing constraints.  Rather than weakening  the volatility implications  to 
18. With more than two securities, one follows a natural generalization of the above 
procedure.  One first locates the edges  of the cone P+. Once they are located, one can 
use Luttmer's  more general algorithm  for computing the bounds with the short-sale 
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accommodate  measured  marginal  rates of substitution  using  aggregate 
data,  we  now  use  the  aggregate  data  to  sharpen the  implications  for 
stochastic  discount  factors that correctly  price the  asset  payoffs.  For in- 
stance,  suppose  a  marginal  rate  of  substitution  ma constructed  from 
aggregate  data is less  than  or equal  to the  market discount  factor y as 
is implied  by  both  versions  of borrowing  constraints.  Then  ma can be 
used to sharpen volatility bounds  for y and, hence,  for the intertemporal 
marginal rates of substitution  of unconstrained  consumers. 
Calculation  of the  mean-standard  deviation  region  for such  discount 
factors is an easy  extension  of our previous  analysis.  In Section  2, we 
reviewed  Hansen  and Jagannathan's  (1991) construction  of least volatile 
stochastic  discount  factors that price assets  and  are greater than  zero. 
Now  we  want  discount  factors that price assets  and  are greater than a 
given  y,  that is,  we  want  y's that satisfy 
E(yx)  =  q and  y  ma.  (4.17) 
As  Hansen  and  Jagannathan  (1991) find  that  frontier discount  factors 
are the larger of some  portfolio  payoff  a  +  x'b  and zero,  now  frontier 
discount  factors have  the  form 
fa+x'b  if a +  x'b > 
ma  y  m  if a + x'b  ma  (4.18) 
for some  two-dimensional  vector  b of portfolio  weights  and  some  real 
number a. A brief description  of how  we  computed  a and b in practice 
is provided  in Appendix  2. 
In Figure 10 we  report calculations  for two  different  specifications  of 
ma  constructed  using  aggregate  consumption  data and values  of y  =  20 
and  35.  For comparative  purposes,  we  also  include  the  bounds  com- 
puted  imposing  only  nonnegativity  (y  -  0).  For values  of y  <  18, the 
feasible region  is empty,  because  ma  fails to satisfy  the pricing inequali- 
ties  (4.14).  (Candidates  ma with  lower  values  of  y entered  the  solvency 
constraint  region  of Figure  9.  They  had  the  same  mean  and  standard 
deviation  as  a random  variable  that  satisfied  the  pricing  inequalities, 
but these  candidates  did  not  themselves  satisfy  the  inequalities.)  As  y 
increases,  the  aggregate  data  is less  informative  about  the  feasible  set 
of stochastic  discount  factors. 
Notice  that for y  =  20, the volatility bounds  are at least doubled,  and 
there is considerably  more  information  about  the  feasible  range  of the 
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loosen  the  implications  of  security  market  data  for  marginal  rates  of 
substitution  computed  from aggregate  data, the data still pose  a striking 
puzzle  for the behavior of unconstrained  consumers.  Thus, even though 
models  with  solvency  constraints  weaken  substantially  the link between 
aggregate  consumption  data and  asset  market returns,  taken  together 
the consumption  and asset  return data still imply  rather startling impli- 
cations for the intertemporal  marginal rates of substitution  of the uncon- 
strained consumers. 
4.6 EXTENSIONS 
Recently,  there  has  been  a variety  of work  in asset  pricing that seems 
well  suited  to  guide  empirical  analyses  of  other  market  frictions.  For 
instance,  Prisman  (1986), Jouni  and  Kallal (1991),  and  Luttmer  (1991) 
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showed  how  to  define  a  meaningful  notion  of  the  Principle  of  No- 
Arbitrage  in  the  presence  of  transactions  costs  and  short-sale  con- 
straints.  In addition,  Jouni  and  Kallal (1991),  building  upon  Harrison 
and Kreps (1979), Kreps  (1981), and  Clark (1990), established  that this 
extended  Principle  of  No-Arbitrage  is  equivalent  to  the  existence  of  a 
counterpart to a strictly positive  stochastic  discount  factor. He and Mod- 
est (1991) and Luttmer (1991) showed  how  to adapt some  of the appara- 
tus described  in Section  2 to accommodate  these  market frictions. 
While  market  frictions  loosen  the  implications  of  asset  pricing  data 
for candidate  discount  factors,  the  important  issues  for  empirical  re- 
search are to assess  the magnitude  and direction  of the alterations and 
to determine  the extent  to which  asset  pricing puzzles  disappear  when 
market  frictions  are  accommodated.  For  example,  Luttmer  (1991) 
showed  that by introducing  bid-ask spreads  into the analysis,  the Term- 
Premium Puzzle implied  by  the  holding  period  returns  on  short-term 
Treasury-bills  is  reduced  to  about  same  order  of  magnitude  as  the 
Equity-Premium  Puzzle. 
A possible  shortcoming  of this approach  is that the imperfections  are 
imposed  directly  on  the  security  markets.  Although  the  solvency-con- 
straint model  presumably  could be justified  in environments  like Town- 
send's  (1980) in which  there are explicit impediments  to communication, 
these  impediments  are extreme  and  cannot  be  used  to rationalize  the 
market-wealth  constraint.  Other  restrictions  on  information  flows  and 
communication  are known  to have  important  implications  for the opti- 
mal allocation  of resources  (e.g.,  see  Atkeson  and  Lucas,  1992; Green, 
1987; Phelan and Townsend,  1991; Prescott and Townsend,  1984; Town- 
send,  1987). However,  to date this literature has not provided  an alter- 
native  tractable  vehicle  for  extracting  information  from  asset  market 
returns in building  models  of dynamic  economies. 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper continues  a line of research that seeks a better understanding 
of  the  implications  of  security  market  data  for building  dynamic  eco- 
nomic models.  More precisely,  we have surveyed  and extended  a litera- 
ture  that  characterizes  stochastic  discount  factors  and  provides 
information  from  asset  market  data  about  the  properties  of  marginal 
rates of substitution  and transformation. 
Our first extension  was  to  consider  the  impact  of  the  correlation  of 
discount  factors with  asset  returns.  A  successful  discount  factor must 
be either highly  correlated with  asset  returns,  or have even  higher vari- 
ance than  indicated  by  the  original bounds  derived  in Hansen  and Ja- 160  .  COCHRANE  & HANSEN 
gannathan (1991). Our second extension used conditioning information 
to split the unconditional variance of discount factors into two compo- 
nents: average conditional variance  and variation  in conditional means. 
These  two  extensions  refine  previous  characterizations  of  stochastic 
discount factors. Quarterly discount factors should be highly volatile 
(standard deviation at least .24 based on unconditional moments, .38 
based on conditional  moments), they should have a mean of about .998, 
they should be highly correlated  with asset returns or have even higher 
variance, and most of their unconditional variation must be accounted 
for by average conditional variation  rather  than variation  of conditional 
means. These characterizations  may help in the further refinement of 
frictionless  representative consumer models. Alternatively, we may be 
led to consider models with market frictions. 
While market frictions loosen the implications of asset pricing data 
for candidate discount factors, the important issues for empirical re- 
search are to assess the magnitude and direction of the alterations  and 
to determine the extent to which asset pricing puzzles disappear when 
market  frictions  are accommodated. Our analysis focused on two forms 
of frictions:  solvency constraints and market-wealth  constraints. These 
seemed to alleviate the puzzles to some extent. However, it appears 
that our estimated "average" shadow value of the market-wealth  con- 
straint is implausibly high,  and that the solvency constraint implies 
extreme  volatility for the intertemporal  marginal  rates of substitution of 
the unconstrained consumers. 
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APPENDIX  1 
In this  appendix  we  provide  more  information  about  our  method  for 
computing  Figure  5.  The  aim  is  to  minimize  E[var(yl  I)]  subject  to  a 
constraint that var[E(ylqg)] =  c for some  valid  positive  number  c. First, 
write the expected  conditional  variance  of y as 
E[var(y  I)]  =  E(y2) -  E{[E(y  I)]2},  (A.1) 
and the variance of E(ylIg) as 164 *  COCHRANE  & HANSEN 
var[E(y  lI)]  =  E[E(y|  )2]  -  (Ey)2.  (A.2) 
Then the associated Lagrangian  is given by 
?  =  E(y2) -  (1  +  X)E{[E(y|S)]2} +  X(Ey)2.  (A.3) 
Finally, as argued in the text, use the representation  of the conditional 
mean-standard deviation frontier for stochastic discount factors given 
in Gallant, Hansen, and Tauchen (1990): 
Yw  =  P* +  we*,  (A.4) 
where w E ',  p* is the minimum second moment stochastic discount 
factor and e* is the error in the conditional projection of a unit payoff 
onto the vector x of payoffs used in an econometric analysis. Explicit 
formulas are given in Gallant, Hansen, and Tauchen. In solving the 
constrained  minimization problem it suffices to look at discount factors 
of the form (A.4). Hence, we only need to choose w. 
To derive the first-order  conditions, we follow the usual practice of 
perturbing  the optimal w in any arbitrary  direction in the conditioning 
information set 'S. The optimal (real) coefficient on that perturbation 
must be zero for all such directions. This results in the following first- 
order conditions for the optimization: 
E(ywe*l6) -  (1 +  X)E(ywJI)E(e*I))  +  X(Eyw)E(e*l6)  =  0.  (A.5) 
Because e* is the conditional projection error of a unit payoff onto the 
vector x of payoffs, the corresponding projection  is 1 -  e*. Hence, e*  is 
conditionally orthogonal to 1 -  e*, and 
E[(e*)2  |  ]  =  E(e*I ).  (A.6) 
It follows from (A.4) and (A.6) that 
E(ywe*l ) = wE[(e*)2  1] 
= wE(e*lI).  (A.7) 
Substituting  equation (A.7) into equation (A.5) and dividing by E(e*  IC) 
gives 
w  -  (1  +  X)E(ywl<)  +  X(Eyw) =  0  (A.8) 
Solving equations  (A.8) and  (A.4)  for w  gives  the  solution  to  the 
problem. Comment.  165 
APPENDIX  2 
In this appendix we briefly describe an algorithm  that we used to con- 
struct  the volatility bounds reported in Figure 10. The algorithm  is very 
similar  but not identical to one suggested by Hansen and Jagannathan 
(1992)  for computing specification error  bounds. 
Step  1: Transform  prices so that the new pricing formula is 
E[(y  -  ma)x] =  q  where  q  -  q  -  E(max). 
Step  2: Find the arbitrage  bounds for pricing unit payoff with the q 
prices. 
Step  3: Augment x with a unit payoff and augment q with a corre- 
sponding ^ price of a unit payoff within the arbitrage  bounds. Setting 
a ^ price for a unit payoff determines the mean of y via: 
Ey =  *r(1) +  Ema. 
Step  4: Find the arbitrage  bounds for pricing ma  using the augmented 
payoffs and prices. For  each price, find the minimum norm nonnegative 
stochastic discount factor by solving the dual problem in Hansen and 
Jagannathan  (1991). Note that 
E(y2)  =  E[(y  -  ma)2]  +  2E[(y  -  ma)ma]  +  E[(ma)2]. 
By fixing the price assignment to ma,  we fix the middle term, and the 
third term is fixed by our measure of ma.  Hence, we minimize the left 
side by minimizing the first term. The dual problem in Hansen and 
Jagannathan  (1991)  is designed to minimize E[(y -  ma)2]  by choice of a 
nonnegative  value  of (y  -  ma) subject to the pricing restriction.  Finally, 
minimize  E(y2) by choice  of the price assignment  to ma. 
Notice  that  step  3  provides  a  mean  and  step  4  the  corresponding 
second  moment  bound.  Since  the  mean  is fixed  in step  4, we  obtain a 
corresponding  volatility  bound.  Steps  3 and 4 must  be repeated  for all  A  price assignments  to a unit payoff  within  the arbitrage bounds. 
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by Lewis Carroll, "The Hunting  of the Snark." The poem  describes how 
an  ill-assorted  crew  of  adventurers  pursued  the  Snark  with  single- 
minded  zeal: 
They sought  it with  thimbles,  they  sought  it with  care; 
They pursued  it with  forks and hope; 
They threatened  its life with  a railway  share; 
They charmed  it with  smiles  and  soap. 
Technology  and terminology  have  advanced  since  Lewis  Carroll's day, 
and the  Snark is now  referred to as a stochastic  discount  factor, while 
the  threat to its life is known  as the  equity  premium  puzzle.  I should 
add that the pursuit  of the  Snark is dangerous: 
But oh,  beamish  nephew,  beware  of the day, 
If your Snark be a Boojum! For then 
You will  softly  and  suddenly  vanish  away, 
And  never  be met with  again! 
The Snark in  the  poem  turns  out  to be  a Boojum,  with  the  predicted 
consequences.  Modern  asset  pricing research must  also beware  of Boo- 
jums,  for reasons  that  should  become  clear in  the  course  of  this  dis- 
cussion. 
The paper uses  a clever graphical technique  developed  by Lars Han- 
sen  and Ravi Jagannathan.  The basic idea  is to move  from the familiar 
mean-standard  deviation  diagram for returns, as used  in every introduc- 
tory finance  course,  to a mean-standard  deviation  diagram for the sto- 
chastic discount factor. The diagram  for returns  is plotted  with  mean  on 
the  vertical  and  standard  deviation  on  the  horizontal  axis,  while  the 
diagram for the  stochastic  discount  factor is plotted  with  the  mean  on 
the horizontal  and the standard deviation  on the vertical axis. This con- 
vention  makes  sense  in that one  thinks  of mean  returns as being  deter- 
mined  by  second  moments  of returns,  whereas  for stochastic  discount 
factors,  we  calculate  a minimum  standard  deviation  for each  possible 
mean.  Given  any  set of asset  returns  (or their first two  moments),  one 
can calculate  a feasible  region  in return space  and  a corresponding  re- 
gion in stochastic  discount  factor space. 
This apparatus can be used  in two main ways.  First, one can compare 
different  asset  return  data sets to  see  which  is  likely  to  be  the  most 
challenging  for  asset  pricing  theory.  The  idea  is  simple.  Consider  a 
hypothetical  riskless  return equal to the reciprocal of the mean  stochas- 
tic discount  factor. On  the  return diagram,  the riskless  return plots  on Comment 167 
the  vertical  axis  and  the  Sharpe  ratio is  the  slope  of  the  tangent  line 
from the riskless return to the feasible region defined  by the risky assets. 
On the stochastic  discount  factor diagram,  the Sharpe ratio is the slope 
of the line from the origin to the boundary  of the set of feasible  stochas- 
tic discount  factors. Thus, for any given  mean stochastic discount  factor, 
a higher  Sharpe  ratio gives  a tighter  bound  on  the  standard  deviation 
of the discount  factor. The Sharpe ratio measures  how  puzzling  an asset 
return data  set  is,  in  the  sense  that a higher  Sharpe  ratio must  be  ac- 
counted  for by a more volatile  stochastic  discount  factor. 
The Hansen-Jagannathan  apparatus  can also be used  to compare  dif- 
ferent asset pricing models. This is the hunt for the Snark; Cochrane and 
Hansen  review  many different models  and show  how  to plot the means 
and standard deviations  of their implied  stochastic  discount  factors. The 
Snark is found  when  some  model  gives  a stochastic  discount  factor that 
plots  within  the  feasible  region  calculated  from  the  asset  return  data 
set.  (Even  then,  of  course,  the  model  may  not  satisfy  the  full  set  of 
restrictions  on the stochastic  discount  factor.) 
This procedure can be useful,  but it is important to be aware that there 
is uncertainty  about  the mean  and  standard  deviation  of the  stochastic 
discount  factor in  a particular model.  Thus,  we  really  need  standard 
error bounds  not only  for the feasible  region  of the  stochastic  discount 
factor, but also for the points  corresponding  to particular models. 
At  one  level  this  is  a minor  complaint:  If we  can  calculate  realized 
stochastic  discount  factors,  then  we  can easily  use  Generalized  Method 
of Moments  to estimate  uncertainty  about  the  population  moments  of 
these  discount  factors.  But my  concern  is precisely  that we  don't  have 
the right data even  to calculate realized stochastic  discount  factors. Most 
of  the  models  considered  in  this  paper  obtain  discount  factors  from 
aggregate  consumption  data.  But suppose  there are small errors in ag- 
gregate  consumption.  These  might  be due  to time aggregation,  imper- 
fect  sampling  procedures,  or  errors  in  price  indexes  arising  from 
unmeasured  quality  improvement.  More  fundamentally,  they  might 
arise from aggregation  problems.  For example  there are models  in which 
the upward drift in aggregate  consumption  arises not from optimal post- 
ponement  of individual  consumption,  but from the replacement  of old 
finite-lived  agents  by new,  richer ones.  Gregory  Mankiw  and  Stephen 
Zeldes  have  used  panel  data  to  document  systematic  differences  be- 
tween  the consumption  patterns  of stockholders  and  nonstockholders, 
and  there  is  time-series  evidence  that  aggregate  consumption  tracks 
aggregate  income,  suggesting  that some  agents  do not  trade optimally 
in financial  markets.  In addition,  Cochrane  has  shown  in earlier work 
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tion  have  only  small  utility  costs  and  may  therefore  arise  from  small 
transaction  or optimization  costs.  In any  event,  quite  small  errors in 
aggregate  consumption  can  have  large  effects  on  the  Hansen-Jagan- 
nathan  stochastic  discount  factor diagram,  particularly in models  with 
habit  formation  or high-risk  aversion  in  which  marginal  utility  is  ex- 
tremely  sensitive  to  consumption.  The  diagram  does  not  allow  us  to 
think about this data uncertainty  in any useful  way. 
I could put this point  even  more strongly.  Suppose  some  clever econ- 
omist  does  discover  a nonlinear  transformation  of  the  aggregate  con- 
sumption  series  that  plots  in the  Hansen-Jagannathan  feasible  region 
for discount  factors (or, less plausibly,  that satisfies  the full set of restric- 
tions on a stochastic  discount  factor). Does  this mean we  should  adopt 
the corresponding  model  of utility? In my  own  view  we  should  do  so 
only with  great caution: The problems  with  consumption  data are such 
that the  Snark is likely to be a Boojum. 
My discussion  of this point  may sound  rather negative,  but there are 
in fact useful  things  to be done.  One  can apply  the Hansen-Jagannath- 
an methodology  over  longer  horizons,  where  measurement  problems 
with  aggregate  consumption  are likely  to  be  less  serious,  or one  can 
replace aggregate  consumption  with  an asset  portfolio that proxies well 
for consumption  at low  frequencies.  One  can solve  for consumption  as 
a function  of underlying  state variables  that may  be easier  to measure 
than consumption  itself, as I have done  in recent work.  Or, as Cochrane 
has  done,  one  can  look  at investment  and  firm behavior  rather than 
consumption;  even  if the  measurement  problems  with  investment  are 
as great as those  with  consumption,  at least investment  provides  some 
independent  evidence.  In my  view  any  of these  approaches  are likely 
to be  more  fruitful  than  further  torturing  the  aggregate  consumption 
series. 
I now  turn to a more general concern about the Cochrane and Hansen 
approach.  In common  with  most  work  in empirical finance,  this paper 
takes the  second  moments  of realized  returns  as given,  rather than  as 
something  to be explained.  But to a macroeconomist,  it is more natural 
to think of realized returns as endogenous,  determined  in the macroeco- 
nomic arena along with other aggregate variables. Macroeconomic  mod- 
els have implications  for realized  return behavior,  and we can therefore 
learn about the macroeconomy  by testing  these  implications.  Cochrane 
and  Hansen  are largely  silent  about  this  because  they  are excessively 
focused  on  the hunt  for the  Snark, the  stochastic  discount  factor map- 
ping  second  moments  to means  of returns. 
I would  summarize  recent work on the stock market as follows.  First, 
as a matter of logic,  realized  stock returns must be attributable either to 
changing  expected  dividends,  or to changing  expected  returns.  Second, Comment  - 169 
it seems  that changing  expected  returns  account  for the  bulk  of  stock 
price variation.  Third,  this  is consistent  with  the  limited  predictability 
of  stock  returns  at  short  horizons  because  expected  stock  returns  are 
highly  persistent,  so  small  fluctuations  in expected  returns  have  large 
effects  on prices.  Fourth,  these  stylized  facts apply  equally  well  to real 
stock  returns  and  to  excess  stock  returns  over  Treasury-bill  returns. 
Fifth,  there  is cyclical variation  in  expected  stock  returns: Returns  are 
predictably  high  during  the  later stages  of recessions  and  low  during 
the later stages  of expansions. 
What  are  the  implications  of  this  for  macroeconomic  modeling?  A 
successful  model  will be explicitly  dynamic  and will involve  changes  in 
risk premia resulting  from persistent  shifts in risk or risk aversion.  Most 
existing  models  have  changing  real interest  rates but constant  risk pre- 
mia, so this is a major challenge  to general  equilibrium  model  builders. 
An even  greater challenge  is to build  a macro model  that explains  the 
cash  flows  on  stocks  as  well  as  their  expected  returns.  The  leading 
approach  for  the  last  decade  or  so  has  been  the  exchange  model  in 
which  stocks  are modeled  as claims  to aggregate  consumption.  In my 
view  a more promising  approach,  again related to some  of Cochrane's 
work, is to model  stocks as claims to installed  capital in a general equilib- 
rium model  with  adjustment  costs  to investment. 
In conclusion,  I strongly  agree with  Cochrane and Hansen  that asset 
market data can provide  valuable  evidence  about  the  workings  of the 
macroeconomy.  I endorse  their  call for research  at the  intersection  of 
finance and macroeconomics.  I think the Hansen-Jagannathan  diagram 
can  be  a  useful  tool  for  research  and  communication,  but  it  should 
not be used  to excess.  In several  places  Cochrane  and Hansen  refer to 
parametric models  as  "straitjackets,"  but this  is a rather inappropriate 
metaphor.  A  straitjacket is  something  one  wants  to get  out  of; a para- 
metric model  is  more  like  a tuxedo,  something  one  wants  to  get  into 
when  the time is right.  In any event  the Hansen-Jagannathan  diagram 
can also become  a straitjacket if it excludes  a broader look at asset  price 
determination. 
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mography,  and  provide  a  different,  and  therefore  useful,  metric  to 
assess  the validity  of our theoretical  representations  of the world. 
John  Cochrane  and  Lars Hansen  obviously  share  this  premise.  But 
their paper-despite  its title-unfortunately  does  not  tell us which les- 
sons can be drawn from the asset pricing literature. Instead of reflecting 
directly on  the  central issues  confronting  both  macroeconomics  and  fi- 
nance,  it provides  us  with  a reasoned  summary  and  some  extensions 
of the research program launched  a few years ago by Hansen  and Jagan- 
nathan  (1991). And  the  authors-instead  of  surveying  the  largely  un- 
charted  territory  lying  at  the  boundaries  of  macroeconomics  and 
finance,  and  of explaining  why  these  are lands  worth  for macroecono- 
mists to explore-present  us with  a superb but somewhat  too narrowly 
focused  examination  of  some  of the  uses  of  the  diagnostic  tool  devel- 
oped  by Hansen  and Jagannathan  (1991). 
This diagnostic  tool-a  dual of the traditional mean-variance  frontier 
for  intertemporal  rates  of  marginal  substitution-draws  both  its  ele- 
gance  and  its weakness  from the  fact that it is essentially  atheoretical. 
Except for the maintained  hypothesis  that consumers  optimize  some ob- 
jective  function,  it is  model-free  and  requires  few  assumptions.  As  a 
consequence-and  this is the undeniable  beauty of the approach-there 
are no "false positives"  in the Hansen-Jagannathan  medical tests: Mod- 
els that the Hansen-Jagannathan  tests  declare to have  health problems 
are indeed  terminally  ill. A prominent  example  is the complete  market, 
representative  agent model  with homothetic  time-additive  expected  util- 
ity preferences  studied  by  so  many  authors:  It does  not  pass,  and  by 
far, the Hansen-Jagannathan  tests.'  However,  because  its very theoret- 
ical  agnosticism,  the  Hansen-Jagannathan  framework  in  itself  offers 
very  few  insights  as  to  why  specific  models  pass  or fail the  Hansen- 
Jagannathan tests. 
But because  we-macroeconomists-must  go  beyond  the  diagnosis 
of diseases  and investigate  their etiology to be able to draw policy impli- 
cations,  the  Hansen-Jagannathan  methods  must  be complemented  by 
a careful theoretical analysis  of the models  Cochrane and Hansen  study. 
Only such an analysis  can reveal the deep economic  rationale for failures 
or successes  in  the  Hansen-Jagannathan  metric,  and  provide  the  les- 
sons  that asset  pricing has  to teach to macroeconomics. 
As a case in point,  I examine  an instance in which  the sole application 
1. Cochrane  and Hansen rightly  point out that, as a consequence, the failure  of this model 
to replicate  the historically  observed levels of the equity premium-the  equity  premium 
puzzle  (Mehra  and Prescott, 1985)-and  of the rate of return  on safe bonds-the  riskless 
rate  puzzle  (Weil, 1989)-has  nothing to do with details of the parameterization  of the 
aggregate income or dividend process but rather reflects a much more fundamental 
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of  Hansen-Jagannathan  methods  to  asset  market  data  provides  little 
guidance,  or even  misdirected  guidance,  to macroeconomics:  habit  forma- 
tion models.  I then  draw what  I view  to be one of the main implications 
for  macroeconomics  of  the  work  of  Cochrane,  Hansen,  and  Jagan- 
nathan:  it  confirms  that  we  should  abandon  the  complete  market 
paradigm. 
1. Is It Really  Habit  Formation?2 
One of the few success  stories of recent years-as  far as the asset pricing 
literature with  complete  frictionless  markets is concerned-is  the habit 
formation model  of Constantinides  (1990). Although  the Constantinides 
model  predicts,  as  correctly  pointed  out  by  Cochrane  and  Hansen,  a 
counterfactually  high  volatility  of  the  riskless  rate,  it does  succeed  in 
matching  the  level  and  structure  of  equilibrium  rates  of  return  better 
than most  models. 
What is troubling,  however,  and should  raise in our minds  a red flag 
that something  unrelated  to habit formation  per se  might  be  going  on 
in  the  Constantinides  model-something  not  revealed  by  Hansen- 
Jagannathan tests-is  the fact that a series of economically  unrelated but 
formally rather similar models  based on formally small but economically 
crucial amendments  to the  Constantinides  setup,  also  does  quite  well 
according  to the Hansen-Jagannathan  metric. 
This series of models  takes as its point of departure an infinitely  lived 
representative  agent,  living  in  a  Lucas  (1978)  tree  economy,  who 
chooses  a path of consumption  to maximize 
Eo  t (Ct 
-  Xt  (1) 
t=0 
1 - 
This setup  encompasses  two  known  models.  First, when  0  =  0,  it re- 
duces  to the  original  Mehra-Prescott  framework.  Second,  when  0 >  0 
and  xt  =  ct_-,  it  becomes  the  version  of  the  habit  formation  model 
examined  by  Cochrane  and  Hansen.3  But  it  also  nests  three  other 
models: 
A relative  consumption  model  in which  0 >  0, and xt is per capita lagged 
aggregate  consumption,  taken as given  by a representative  consumer. 
Of course,  in equilibrium,  xt =  ct_ . 
2. This discussion borrows from Restoy and Weil (1992). 
3. The (related)  consumption  durability  model with 0 < 0 and xt = c_t-  is unambiguously 
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* A trending subsistence  level model  in which  0 >  0 and xt is a time-trend. 
* A fixed subsistence level model  in which  0 >  0 and xt is a constant. 
Let us explore  these  three models. 
1.1 RELATIVE  CONSUMPTION  MODEL 
The relative consumption  model  offers-in  the spirit of Abel (1990)4-a 
representation  of the behavior  of consumers  who  try to "catch up with 
the Joneses."  Absent  from the  model  is therefore  any  consideration  of 
habit formation  or rational addiction. 
The  relative  consumption  model  offers  a  striking  formal  similarity 
with  the  habit formation  model:  In both  models,  equilibrium  consump- 
tion  services  are equal  to ct -  Oct_1.  But behind  this  formal  similarity 
hides  a crucial economic  distinction,  as all strategic effects related to habit 
formation  are absent by construction  from the relative  consumption  model. This 
absence manifests  itself most clearly in the Euler equation  of the relative 
consumption  model:  It excludes  the  terms,  present  in the habit forma- 
tion model,  associated  with  the detrimental  effect on tomorrow's  utility 
of increased  consumption  today. 
Figure 1 indicates  that this additive  relative consumption  model  per- 
forms rather well  in the Hansen-Jagannathan  metric,5 e.g.,  when  0  = 
.6, it satisfies the required bounds  for a value of the exponent  y  =  16-a 
performance  strikingly  similar to  that  of  the  standard  habit  formation 
model  (see  Fig. 6 in the authors'  paper). 
Because  a model  with  relative  consumption  effects  cannot  easily  be 
distinguished,  in  the  Hansen-Jagannathan  plots,  from one  with  habit 
formation,  the  conclusion  that  habit formation is  not responsible  for the 
success of the Constantinides model is unavoidable. 
1.2 A TRENDING  SUBSISTENCE  LEVEL  MODEL 
But should  we  conclude  from  Figure  1 that  the  relative  consumption 
model  (1) is a good  representation  of reality? Or is  there,  once  again, 
something  deeper,  not  revealed  by  the  Hansen-Jagannathan  pictures, 
that we  need  to discover? 
The answer is-unfortunately  for the Hansen-Jagannathan  diagnosis 
4. In Abel's (1990)  model, consumption services are equal to the ratio of, instead of the 
difference  between individual consumption purchases and an index of aggregate per 
capita  consumption. 
5. The data are essentially the same as in the original Hansen and Jagannathan  (1991) 
paper. One-month Treasury  bill returns, monthly value-weighted returns, and divi- 
dends are extracted from the CRSP tapes (1959-1986). Consumption is  aggregate 
monthly consumption of non-durables and services in 1982 dollars, divided by the 
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tests-an  unambiguous  yes  if we  consider  the  second  in our series  of 
models  represented  in  (1): a model  with  a trending  subsistence  level. 
In that model,  consumption  services are equal to the difference between 
consumption  purchases,  ct, and a fraction 0 of some  time trend xt. 
The economics  of the  model  are transformed  radically by this seem- 
ingly  minor formal modification.  We are now  assuming  that tastes  are 
changing  in  such  a way  that the  marginal utility  of consumption  pur- 
chases would  increase over time were consumption  purchases  to remain 
constant over time: The model  thus becomes  one in which consumption 
purchases  become  more  desirable  as  time  passes.  This explicitly  rules 
out the very specific behavioral  assumptions  upon  which  the habit for- 
mation and relative consumption  models  are built. 
Despite  the  very  different  nature  of  the  model,  it  is  very  hard  to 
distinguish  qualitatively  the Hansen-Jagannathan  plot for the trending 
subsistence  level  model  from that of either  income  model  or the  habit 
formation  model.  Figure  2  shows  that  intertemporal  marginal  rate of 
Figure  1 RELATIVE  CONSUMPTION  MODEL 
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substitution  implied  by  the  model  satisfies  the  Hansen-Jagannathan 
bounds  for a value  of y  =  7 when  the time trend is taken to be 
Xt =  (1  +  g)tco, 
where g is the average  rate of growth  consumption  over the  1959-1986 
sample  and co is per capita consumption  at the first data point. 
It would  be  pleasant  if we  could  conclude  from this  exercise  that  a 
marginal utility  of consumption  purchases  that increases  (on  average) 
over  time  is  the  ingredient-common  to  the  habit  formation,  relative 
consumption,  and  trending  subsistence  level  models-that  we  need  in 
order to make our models  "work."  Unfortunately,  it turns out that this 
is not true. 
1.3 A FIXED  SUBSISTENCE  LEVEL  MODEL 
The reason  this is not true is that an even  simpler version  of the prefer- 
ences  represented  in  (1),  one  that  does  not exhibit  the  property  that 
Figure  2 TRENDING  SUBSISTENCE  MODEL 
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marginal  utility  of  any  constant  flow  of  consumption  purchases  rises 
over time,  performs  almost  as well  in the  Hansen-Jagannathan  metric 
as the previous  models.  This variant of the  preferences  represented  in 
(1) assumes  that there is a fixed minimum  subsistence  level. 
Figure 3 diagnoses  this model  a la Hansen-Jagannathan.  It assumes 
that 0  =  1 and  thus  identifies  the  fixed  subsistence  level  as xt =  x for 
all t. It takes,  as an example, 
x  =  minct  -  10, 
t 
that is,  it assumes  that the  subsistence  level  is slightly  below  the mini- 
mum  consumption  over  the  sample.  The result  of  this  specification  is 
that  the  implied  stochastic  discount  factor  enters  the  Hansen-Jagan- 
nathan admissible  parabola for a value  of y between  2.5 and 3. 
This  "success"  of  the  simplest  version  of  all the  models  embodied 
in  (1)  leaves  us  with  a  puzzle-to  which  the  Cochrane-Hansen- 
Figure  3 FIXED  SUBSISTENCE  MODEL 
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Jagannathan  apparatus  provides  no answer:  What is going  on in these 
models? 
1.3 A SIMPLE  EXPLANATION 
What  is  going  on  is  in  fact  quite  simple  and  is  demonstrated  most 
clearly,  without  irrelevant  peripheral  behavioral  assumptions,  by  the 
fixed subsistence  level  model. 
In all four  models  (habit formation,  relative  consumption,  trending 
subsistence,  fixed  subsistence),  consumption services are smaller than con- 
sumption purchases. But we  (like most  of  the  literature)  have  assumed 
in (1) that agents  have  power  felicity  functions  that exhibit  decreasing 
absolute  risk aversion  and  decreasing  absolute  prudence.6  As  a conse- 
quence,  at any given  level of consumption  purchases,  consumers  become 
more risk averse and prudent  the smaller consumption  services are rela- 
tive to consumption  purchases. 
Formally, let us use  the fixed subsistence  model  as a benchmark  (and 
assume  0 =  1) to characterize risk aversion  and prudence  for atemporal 
gambles.  Letting 
v(c)  =  (c  -  x)1 -y/(1  -  -), 
straightforward algebra establishes  that the implied  coefficients  of rela- 
tive risk aversion  and  of relative  prudence  are 
-cv"(c)  y  and  -cJ"(c)  y  +  1 
Rt(c(C)  and  (c) 
v'(c)  1 -  x/c  v"(c)  1 -  x/c' 
If the  subsistence  level  is about  80% of consumption  purchases  or,  in 
other  terms,  if  consumption  services  are  approximately  20% of  con- 
sumption  purchases,7  then  x/c  =  .8 and 
it(c) =  5y  and  9(c)  =  5(y  +  1). 
Thus, in the short run, agents  are about five times more risk averse and 
prudent  than  the  traditional  isoelastic  model  (in  which  consumption 
purchases  and services  are equal) would  predict for any given  y. 
This result  sheds  new  light  on  what  might  appear  at first glance  as 
"successes"  in  the  Hansen-Jagannathan  metric.  Saying,  for instance, 
6. See Kimball  (1990)  for a definition of prudence. 
7. Such fractions  are in line, for instance, with one of the most successful specifications 
examined  in the Constantinides  (1990)  habit formation  model. Comment-  177 
that our trending  subsistence  level  model  satisfies  the required bounds 
when  0  =  .8 for y  =  7 is meaningless  at best  and misleading  at worst 
unless  one  reflects back on the implied  behavioral  signification  of such 
a y: an implied  coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  of 35 (not  7) and  of 
relative prudence  of 40 (not 8)! No wonder,  then,  that the model appears 
successful:  Very high risk aversion  does  indeed  help  to solve  the equity 
premium  puzzle,  and very  high  prudence  the riskless  rate puzzle!8 No 
wonder,  too,  that this class of models  also implies-as  noted  by Coch- 
rane and Hansen-a  counterfactually  high volatility of riskless returns.9 
But parameterizations  that assumes  a risk aversion  of 35 and  a pru- 
dence  of  40  are  not plausible  in  a  representative  agent  model:  Such 
values,  on the one hand,  imply that individual  consumers  should  accept 
lotteries  that we  know  they  refuse,  and on  the other hand,  are contra- 
dicted by the recent  survey  evidence  collected  by Barsky et al. (1992). 
2. A Lesson  for Macroeconomics 
The foregoing  discussion  has established  that the relative success  in the 
Hansen-Jagannathan  metric  of  the  class  of  models  represented  in  (1) 
relies  on  implausible  assumptions  about  risk aversion  and  prudence: 
The Hansen-Jagannathan  diagnosis  on such models  is thus a false nega- 
tive.  Should  we  conclude,  as a consequence,  that macroeconomics  has 
nothing  to  learn-because  it  is  too  unreliable-from  the  Cochrane- 
Hansen-Jagannathan  machinery? 
Not  quite,  because  the small dose  of theory  we  used  earlier to falsify 
the negative  Hansen-Jagannathan  diagnosis  teaches  us an indirect les- 
son  that I believe  to be  most  important  for macroeconomics-but  that 
Cochrane and Hansen  unfortunately  make short shrift of, namely,  that 
the  macroeconomics  and  finance  should  now  study  economies  with 
incomplete  markets. 
We have  seen  above  that,  to be  successful,  a complete  market,  fric- 
tionless  model  requires  a very  risk averse  and  very  prudent  stand-in 
consumer.10 But as long  as we  cling  to the  representative  agent,  com- 
plete markets paradigm,  this requires very risk averse and very prudent 
individual consumers,  which  we  cannot  plausibly  allow  for. 
8. The former by decreasing the demand for risky assets (which must nevertheless be 
held in equilibrium,  whence an increase in the equilibrium  premium of risky returns 
over riskless returns), and the latter by raising precautionary  saving (an increase that 
must be defeated in equilibrium,  whence the fall in the level of returns). 
9. As high prudence makes saving extremely sensitive to changes in the volatility of 
income. 
10. This is obviously not an exhaustive list. 178  WEIL 
However, I have shown elsewhere1' that as soon as we are willing to 
abandon the complete markets straitjacket,  the implied risk aversion 
and prudence of a pseudo-agent who would consume the economy's 
average consumption and receive its average income are much higher 
than that of individual agents if individual agents have decreasing  abso- 
lute risk aversion and decreasing prudence-an  assumption satisfied by 
power utility functions. Market  incompleteness thus offers the possibil- 
ity of reconciling  the assumption of moderately  risk averse and prudent 
consumers with the need for a highly risk averse and prudent stand-in 
"average"  consumer. 
This qualitative theoretical case for incomplete markets models is 
readily confirmed quantitatively by a Hansen-Jagannathan graph for 
a very simple incomplete markets model. Consider an economy with 
identical multiple-member  households.  At the end of every day, wealth is 
pooled within a household by all its members.12  The distribution  of the 
household's consumption  across its members is random, and the market 
for insuring against this distributional  risk is closed-for  some unspeci- 
fied reason. Assets are traded by individual  members of the household. 
The model is otherwise frictionless. 
Assume that 
Ct  = (1 + E)ct,  EE'  =  O, 
where Ci denotes the individual  consumption of household member i, 
and ct per capita household  consumption. The distribution of e's is the 
same for all members of the households, but realizations differ across 
members. Because all households  are identical, per capita aggregate 
consumption is equal to ct in equilibrium. 
As Cochrane and Hansen note, the standard Hansen-Jagannathan 
bounds are still valid in this model, because there are no frictions, and 
individual  IMRS's  should satisfy them. If one assumes a CRRA  utility 
function with exponent y, individual's i IMRS  is (using the Cochrane- 
Hansen now vs. then notation), 
_  3[thhen] 
- 
P[Cthen(l  +  Ehen)]- 
[Cnow]  [Cnow(1 +  Enow)] 
11. See Weil (1992).  The results in that paper are amplified  by Constantinides  and Duffie 
(1991). 
12. Lucas (1990) has used a similar device to avoid having to deal with distributional 
effects. Comment .  179 
Before we  proceed,  we  should  note  that using  an IMRS computed  on 
the basis of aggregate per capita consumption  would  mistakenly  lead us 
to believe  that there is nothing  useful  in this type  of story told here,  as 
the  model  would  reduce  formally  to the  (unsuccessful)  complete  mar- 
kets  model  with  time-additive  and  separable  power  utility.  The  only 
way  we  could  then  rationalize  the  data would  be  to take y to be very 
large. 
Figure  4  shows,  however,  that  we  do  need  not  much  uninsurable 
individual  risk, beyond  the aggregate risk, to get rather dramatic effects. 
It assumes  that individual  risk e is i.i.d.  and uniformly  distributed  over 
the interval (-2.5%,  2.5%), with  the aggregate  per capita consumption 
taken from the sample  used  earlier. That is, the exercise assumes  a small 
cross-sectional  dispersion  of individual  consumption  of 2.5% on either 
side  of U.S.  aggregate  per capita consumption.  A thousand  individual 
consumption  series  are  then  drawn,  and  for  each  y  the  mi are  con- 
Figure  4 MULTIMEMBER  HOUSEHOLD  MODEL 
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structed,  and their mean  plotted  in Figure 4 (the individual  IMRS's fall 
within  narrow bands  around  this mean). 
The  Hansen-Jagannathan  bounds  are  now  satisfied  for  a value  of 
y  =  7.  But-in  sharp  contrast  with  previous  models-this  value  of  7 
can now  be interpreted  as that of an individual agent  and is thus  much 
more plausible. 
The lesson  macroeconomics  should  draw  from Figure 4 is clear: We 
should  abandon  the complete  market paradigm and investigate  alterna- 
tive  models  (with  incomplete  or imperfect  markets)  much  more  thor- 
oughly.  These  models  have  the  potential,  as  Figure  4  shows,  of 
explaining  asset  market  data  (and  consumption,  and  saving,  and  the 
effects of policy) much better than impoverished  complete  market mod- 
els  with  identical  agents.  But  we  should  not  forget  that  our  task  as 
economists  is not  simply  to say  that we  need  models  with  incomplete 
markets: We should  also think of ways  of rationalizing  and representing 
such  economies. 
3.  Summary 
The main merit of the Cochrane-Hansen  paper is to provide  us with  a 
superb  demonstration  of  how  the  Hansen-Jagannathan  methods  can 
applied  and  extended  to  a wide  variety  of  models  (with  and  without 
frictions).  Although  there  are  no  false  positives  in  the  Hansen- 
Jagannathan  diagnostic  tests,  there  are  false  negatives  (very  promi- 
nently  the habit formation  model),  and  economic  theory  is required  to 
distinguish  true  from  false  negatives.  The  main  lesson  for macroeco- 
nomics  of  the  Cochrane  and  Hansen  paper  is  a confirmation  that we 
should  abandon  the complete  markets paradigm. 
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Discussion 
Responding  to  Philippe  Weil,  Hansen  noted  that  incomplete  market 
models  and subsistence  level  models  may perform adequately  in terms 
of the unconditional  bounds  on the stochastic  discount  factor. However, 
as emphasized  in the  paper,  unconditional  bounds  represent  only  one 
of many  possible  moment  restrictions.  With respect  to the  bounds  on 
the conditional  moments,  these  models  are unlikely  to perform as well. 
Greg Mankiw  remarked  that he  found  these  extensions  of the  Han- 
sen-Jagannathan  bounds  extremely  useful  and  more  appealing  than 
the more statistical but less economically  informative  Hansen-Singleton 
methodology.  He  inquired  about  the  relationship  between  these  two 
methodologies:  If a  model  produces  means  and  variances  inside  the 
moment  bounds,  will  the  restrictions  of  the  model  also  pass  a more 
formal Hansen-Singleton  test? Hansen  responded  that in fact the rela- 
tionship between  the moment  bounds  and the Hansen-Singleton  meth- 
odology  is  not  straightforward.  The  moment  bounds  are  generated 
using  point  estimates  and  marginal  distributions,  while  the  Hansen- 
Singleton  methodology  is a technique  for statistical inference  based  on 
the joint distribution.  The moment  bounds  are a useful  pictorial device 
for understanding  why,  economically,  a particular model  might  not fit 
the data. The Hansen-Singleton  methodology  is a statistical test of the 
model. 
Andrew  Abel questioned  the inference  that could be drawn using  the 
moment  bounds:  The point  estimates  may be outside  the bounds,  but 
how  large are the  associated  standard  errors? He  noted  that the  stan- 
dard deviation  bands  surrounding  the moment  bounds  are not the ap- 
propriate  standard  errors because  they  are calculated  taking  the  point 
estimate  as given.  But the point  estimate  is itself  estimated  with  error. 
Hansen  responded  that this is correct and  that the normal distribution 
theory  cannot  be  applied  to the  graphs  of the  moment  bounds.  How- 
ever,  Table 1 and  Table 2 of  the  paper  were  included  exactly  for this 
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reason and provide the appropriate statistical tests of the moment re- 
strictions. 
Abel also noted that the presence of transactions costs may help to 
explain the equity premium puzzle and that in the paper, Cochrane  and 
Hansen only consider transactions  costs in the bond market. However, 
because transactions  costs in the equity market  are much larger,  perhaps 
transactions  costs can generate the appropriate  stochastic discount fac- 
tor. Hansen responded that the size of the transactions  costs must be 
interpreted relative to the volatility of the return instead of relative to 
the mean return. In this respect, transactions  costs in the equity market 
may not be sufficiently large. Nevertheless, such an extension would 
be useful. 
Matthew Shapiro expressed skepticism about the nearly exclusive fo- 
cus of this literature  on the consumption puzzle. A parallel  puzzle, he 
argued, is the observation that investment and stock returns do not 
move together as q-theory  models of investment predict. Even if econo- 
mists were able to "discover" a specification for utility that solved the 
equity premium puzzle, the investment puzzle would still remain. The 
underlying puzzle to be explained is that stock returns  and real  variables 
(consumption, investment) do not exhibit the degree of covariation  that 
is predicted by Euler-equation-based  models. Therefore,  instead of lev- 
eraging up the variation in stochastic discount factors, Shapiro sug- 
gested it might be more useful to find a way to leverage down the 
variation in stock returns. Hansen agreed that the investment puzzle 
provides many challenges and interesting questions that need  to be 
addressed, and noted that John Cochrane has done some work in this 
direction. 